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INTRODUCTION 
Since India gained independence in 1947, it has had in force 
“security laws” avowedly concerned not with commonplace crime, but 
with acts that ostensibly pose deeper, more enduring threats to ordinary 
life. Terrorism, organized crime, separatism, and public disorder are 
amongst the harms these laws seek to prevent and punish. In addition 
to national security laws, many Indian states1 have state laws 
simultaneously regulating these harms. These “security laws” operate 
alongside India’s ordinary substantive and procedural criminal codes. 
Governments advocating security laws argue that ordinary criminal law 
cannot address certain dangers, and therefore these particularly serious 
dangers require a tailored response. This bespoken response is also a 
heightened response, giving the law and order machinery more power 
than ordinary criminal law allows. 
In this Article, I examine significant security legislation in India and 
trace the ways in which it enhances the executive’s powers. I argue that 
the usual constitutional limits on the executive—electoral democracy, 
legislative scrutiny, judicial review, and constitutional rights—have 
failed to restrain the executive’s power and actions under security laws. 
I demonstrate that the Indian legislature and judiciary have endorsed 
executive powers in principle, and failed to regulate them in practice. 
Repeated endorsement and regulatory failure have, in turn, eroded 
constitutional constraints—in particular, constitutional rights—in 
significant ways. Finally, I consider what measures might feasibly 
make the executive more accountable and moderate its dominance. 
While this inquiry is rooted in the particularities of the Indian 
context, it is relevant beyond India as well, particularly in a century that 
began with the United Nations Security Council exhorting Member 
States to pass counter terrorist legislation.2 Very few countries in the 
developing world have been constitutional democracies for as long as 
 
1 India is a federal country, divided into 29 states and 7 union territories. Union territories 
are smaller geographical and administrative units than states and are governed by the 
national government exclusively, while each state has its own government. The Constitution 
of India lays down the Central Government’s areas of responsibility (subject areas in List I 
of the Seventh Schedule or the Central List), State Governments’ areas of responsibility 
(subject areas in List II of the Seventh Schedule or the State List) as well as areas or issues 
over which both levels of government have shared responsibility (subject areas in List III of 
the Seventh Schedule or the Concurrent List). 
2 See S.C. Res. 1373, (Sept. 28, 2001). 
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India has.3 Across South Asia, legislation and jurisprudence tend to 
draw heavily upon Indian precedent. The Indian experience with 
security laws might help us to understand the vulnerabilities of other 
post colonial, developing democracies, and guard against these 
vulnerabilities when crafting counter terrorist legislation. 
In Part I of this Article, I trace the chronology of major security 
legislation since India gained independence in 1947. In Part II of the 
Article, I highlight features of these laws that depart from ordinary 
criminal law and grant extraordinary power to the executive. Then, I 
discuss in Part III the practical consequences of security laws. In Part 
IV, I reflect upon the legislature’s role in passing security laws and, in 
Part V, upon the Indian Supreme Court’s response when the 
constitutionality of security laws has been challenged. Finally, in Part 
VI, I consider directions for reform. 
I 
SECURITY LEGISLATION SINCE INDEPENDENCE: EXPANSION AND 
ENTRENCHMENT 
The Indian Penal Code (IPC)4 criminalizes the standard array of 
violent crimes and property crimes. Those who kill or injure another 
person commit long established crimes, as do those who harm public 
or private property, for which they can be investigated, charged, and 
prosecuted. In addition, the IPC includes security and public order 
crimes,5 such as sedition,6 the offense of “promoting enmity between 
different groups” based upon identity, and “doing acts prejudicial to the 
maintenance of harmony.”7 Intentionally committing any of these 
forbidden acts is a criminal offense. It is also an offense under Indian 
law to help another person to commit them, encourage another person 
 
3 India gained independence from British rule in August 15, 1947, adopted a national 
constitution on November 26, 1949, which came into force on January 26, 1950, and held 
its first national elections in 1951. 
4 See PEN. CODE (1860) (India). 
5 PEN. CODE §§ 121–130, 141–160 (1860). 
6 PEN. CODE § 124A (1860). 
7 PEN. CODE § 153A (1860).  
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to commit them,8 attempt unsuccessfully to commit them,9 or plan to 
commit them.10 
Past and present security laws have operated alongside the IPC, 
which defines substantive offenses, and the Code of Criminal 
Procedure (CrPC), which lays down rules of criminal procedure. 
Below, I discuss how security laws were developed and expanded since 
India became independent in 1947. 
A. Preventive Detention 
The Preventive Detention Act11 (PDA) was passed in 1950, soon 
after the Constitution of India came into force. This law authorized the 
government to detain individuals without charge for up to a year. 
Initially, the PDA was passed as a temporary, twelve-month measure 
to deal with the challenges of governing after the devastating violence 
and displacement that accompanied the partition of India.12 When 
introducing this initial, twelve-month version of the PDA, the Minister 
of Home Affairs told Parliament that permanent preventive detention 
powers “required closer study” before more lasting legislation was 
passed.13 However, the Act was renewed repeatedly for almost two 
decades before finally being allowed to expire in 1969. 
In 1971, two years after the Preventive Detention Act lapsed, the 
Maintenance of Internal Security Act14 (MISA) was passed, and it 
 
8 PEN. CODE §§ 107–120 (1860). 
9 The Indian Penal Code does not define what it means, in general, to attempt an offense. 
However, common law principles on liability for an attempt apply in India, and are reflected 
in the IPC. PEN. CODE § 511 (1860) lays down the general rule for punishment for 
attempting an imprisonable offense. In addition, the IPC creates some offenses of attempting 
to commit a particular offense, such as the offense of attempted murder and the controversial 
offense of attempted suicide. See PEN. CODE §§ 307–309 (1860). The IPC places some 
attempts on the same footing as the completed offense, and specifies the same sanction for 
the attempt as for the full offense. See, e.g., PEN. CODE §§ 124–126 (1860). 
10 PEN. CODE §§ 120A–120B (1860). 
11 The Preventive Detention Act, 1950, No. 4, Acts of Parliament, 1950 (India) 
[hereinafter PDA]. 
12 Pradyumna K. Tripathi, Preventive Detention: the Indian Experience, 9 AM. J. COMP. 
L. 219, 222 (1960); Anil Kalhan et al., Colonial Continuities: Human Rights, Terrorism, 
and Security Laws in India, 20 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 93, 135 (2006). 
13 A.G. Noorani, Preventive Detention in India, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WKLY., Oct. 
5, 1991, at 2608 (quoting Vallabhbhai Patel); Derek P. Jinks, The Anatomy of an 
Institutionalized Emergency: Preventive Detention and Personal Liberty in India, 22 MICH. 
J. INT’L L. 311, 341-342 (2001). See also Kalhan, supra note 11. 
14 The Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971, No. 26, Acts of Parliament, 1971 
(India) [hereinafter MISA]. 
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resurrected most of the preventive detention powers under the PDA. 
These powers were widened in 1975, when the government declared a 
state of national emergency, and procedural protections originally built 
into MISA were removed.15 Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s      
government used MISA aggressively against political opponents, trade 
unions, and civil society groups who challenged the government. In 
1977, the government lifted its declaration of emergency and called 
national elections. The incumbent Prime Minister and her party were 
voted out of power, and the new national government, some of whose 
members had personally been preventively detained, repealed the now 
notorious MISA. 
However, when proposing to repeal MISA, the Janata Party led 
government also proposed incorporating preventive detention powers 
into ordinary law.16 While this did not happen, two years later, the 
National Security Act of 198017 (NSA) created preventive detention 
powers akin to those in the Preventive Detention Act and the 
Maintenance of Internal Security Act. The NSA continues to be in 
force. 
B. Domestic Deployment of the Military 
In addition to preventive detention laws, legislation granting the 
executive greater power to use force than is allowed under the CrPC 
was also passed fairly soon after independence. In September 1958, the 
Indian Parliament passed the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act18 
(AFSPA), which enhanced the domestic, civilian powers of the armed 
forces. AFSPA empowered the military to act alongside the police in 
designated “disturbed areas,” while giving soldiers greater power to use 
 
15 A state of emergency was formally declared on 25 June 1975 by the Indian President, 
Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed under Article 352 of the Constitution of India, on the request of the 
then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. This period, described in India simply as “the 
Emergency,” lasted from June 25, 1975, to March 21, 1977. During this time, constitutional 
rights were suspended, judicial review restricted, and the media heavily censored. For a 
historical account of “the Emergency,” see RAMACHANDRA GUHA, INDIA AFTER GANDHI: 
THE HISTORY OF THE WORLD’S LARGEST DEMOCRACY at 488–521 (Picador 2007). For an 
anthropological account focusing on the experiences of ordinary citizens affected by forced 
sterilization and slum clearance programs, see EMMA TARLO, UNSETTLING MEMORIES: 
NARRATIVES OF THE EMERGENCY IN DELHI (Hurst & Co. 2003). 
16 Kalhan, supra note 12, at 192. 
17 The National Security Act, 1980, No. 65, Acts of Parliament, 1980 (India) [hereinafter 
NSA]. 
18 The Armed Forces (Assam and Manipur) Special Powers, 1958, No. 28, Acts of 
Parliament, 1958 (India) [hereinafter AFSPA]. 
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force against civilians than the police were allowed to use. Originally, 
the national government enacted the AFSPA in response to separatist 
movements in Nagaland,19 a state in northeast India. By 1972, it was 
extended to all seven states in India’s northeast.20 From 1983 to 1997, 
the national government applied an iteration of the law to the state of 
Punjab,21 and in 1990, a similar iteration to the northern state of Jammu 
& Kashmir, where it continues to be in force.22 
C. Proscribing Organizations and Creating “Status Offenses” 
In 1967, the national government supplemented its preventive 
detention powers when a new law, the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) 
Act23 (UAPA) gave it the power to declare organizations “unlawful” 
and then limit their activities and scrutinize their members to a 
significant degree. Just as individuals could be designated as 
potentially dangerous and detained without a trial, organizations too 
could now be designated suspect, without the state having to prove 
those suspicions to a criminal standard of proof in a court of law. Once 
the government categorized an organization as unlawful, this 
designation was the foundation for criminalizing membership or 
support of the organization. 
D. Anti-terrorism Laws 
1. TADA 
The Indian parliament passed the Terrorist Affected Areas (Special 
Courts) Act24 in 1984, which allowed the national government to 
designate parts of the country as “terrorist affected” and to set up 
 
19 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, GETTING AWAY WITH MURDER: 50 YEARS OF THE ARMED 
FORCES (SPECIAL POWERS) ACT (2008) at 13. 
20 These include the states of Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, 
Mizoram, Nagaland, and Tripura. 
21 The Armed Forces (Punjab and Chandigarh) Special Powers Act, 1983, No. 34, Acts 
of Parliament, 1983 (India). This state-specific iteration has the same provisions as AFSPA 
1958. 
22 The Armed Forces (Jammu and Kashmir) Special Powers Act, 1990, No. 21, Acts of 
Parliament, 1990 (India).  This state-specific iteration has the same provisions as AFSPA 
1958. 
23 The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, No. 37, Acts of Parliament, 1967 
(India) [hereinafter UAPA]. 
24 The Terrorist Affected Areas (Special Courts) Act, 1984, No. 61, Acts of Parliament, 
1984 (India). 
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special courts in those areas to prosecute defendants accused of being 
terrorists. A year later, this law was incorporated into the Terrorist and 
Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act25 (TADA). TADA also created 
new criminal offenses related to terrorist activity, enhanced procedural 
powers for the police, and significantly reduced procedural protections 
for defendants. 
TADA incorporated a sunset clause—Parliament had to review and 
renew the Act every two years.26 Evidence of human rights abuses 
under TADA mounted over time27 and TADA was allowed to lapse 
when it lost the support of opposition parties in Parliament in 1995. 
However, as when the notorious preventive detention law, MISA, was 
repealed in 1977, the government of the day proposed incorporating 
many of TADA’s provisions into ordinary criminal law.28 This 
proposal failed,29 but in the wake of terrorist attacks on the World Trade 
Center in New York City on September 11, 2001, the ruling National 
Democratic Alliance proposed a new anti-terror law. 
2. POTA 
Citing international obligations and cross border terrorism as 
reasons,30 the Indian government proposed a new anti-terrorism law in 
 
25 The Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987, No. 28, Acts of 
Parliament, 1987 (India) [hereinafter TADA]. 
26 TADA, supra note 25, § 1(4). 
27 SOUTH ASIA HUMAN RIGHTS DOCUMENTATION CENTRE, ALTERNATE REPORT AND 
COMMENTARY TO THE UNITED NATION HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE ON INDIA’S THIRD 
PERIODIC REPORT UNDER ARTICLE 40 OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND 
POLITICAL RIGHTS (1997), http://www.hrdc.net/sahrdc/resources/alternate_report.htm. 
28 The Criminal Law (Amendment) Bill was introduced in 1995, but was allowed to 
lapse. 
29 For a critical analysis of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Bill and its effects on the 
rights of the defense, see SOUTH ASIA HUMAN RIGHTS DOCUMENTATION CENTRE, SUPER 
TADA: UNDECLARED EMERGENCY THROUGH THE BACKDOOR (South Asia Human Rights 
Documentation Centre. 1999), http://hrdc.net/sahrdc/hrfeatures/HRF12.htm. 
30 The Ministry of Home Affairs, in its press briefing on the Prevention of Terrorism 
Ordinance, speaks of “an upsurge of terrorist activities, intensification of cross-border 
terrorism” and says “terrorism has now acquired global dimensions and become a challenge 
for the entire world.” Quoted in SOUTH ASIA HUMAN RIGHTS DOCUMENTATION CENTRE, 
PREVENTION OF TERRORISM ORDINANCE 2001: GOVERNMENT DECIDES TO PLAY JUDGE 
AND JURY (South Asia Human Rights Documentation Centre. 2001), at 16. Arguments for 
a new law drew strength from the international climate after 9/11. The United Nations 
Security Council passed a resolution urging states to pass anti-terror legislation, but omitted 
to caution states that such measures be designed to respect international law on human 
rights. See S.C. Res. 1373 (Sept. 28, 2001). 
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2001, the Prevention of Terrorism Act31 (POTA). POTA incorporated 
TADA’s enhanced police powers, limits on the rights of the defense, 
and special courts, with many of POTA’s provisions reproducing 
verbatim the equivalent provisions in TADA32 In addition, POTA 
enhanced the government’s power to detain individuals and forfeit the 
proceeds of terrorism. Further, while TADA had a two-year sunset 
clause, the sunset clause in POTA was three years33 
POTA had a fractious journey through Parliament, and soon sparked 
controversy. The ruling alliance at the time was led by the Bharatiya 
Janata Party, which espouses Hindu-majoritarian political positions. In 
2002, this law was used to prosecute Muslims suspected of setting 
alight a train carriage carrying Hindu pilgrims but was not similarly 
used to prosecute Hindus suspected of participating in state supported 
mass violence that killed 2000 people, most of them Muslim.34 POTA 
never managed to shed its association with a partisan political agenda. 
During the next general elections, the main opposition parties pledged 
to repeal the Act. It was, in fact, repealed in September 2004, after the 
NDA was ousted from power on the initiative of a newly elected 
government formed by a coalition of political parties called the United 
Progressive Alliance (UPA). 
3. The Amended UAPA 
A few years later, the UPA government recanted its rejection of a 
special anti-terrorism law after multiple, brutal terrorist attacks in 
Mumbai on November 26, 2008. Within a month of these attacks, the 
UPA led national government proposed and Parliament agreed to 
amend the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act of 1967 (UAPA)35 
 
31 The Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002, No. 15, Acts of Parliament, 2002 (India) 
[hereinafter POTA]. 
32 See the following provisions dealing with defining terrorism offenses and specifying 
punishment for these offenses: TADA § 1(2) and POTA § 1(2); TADA § 3(1) and POTA § 
3(1)(a); TADA § 3(2) and POTA § 3(2); TADA § 3(3) and POTA § 3(3); TADA § 3(5) and 
POTA § 3(5); TADA § 6 and POTA § 5. See also the following provisions related to the 
operation of special courts: TADA §§ 9-10 and POTA §§ 23-24; TADA § 12 and POTA § 
26; TADA § 13 and POTA § 28. See also the substantial overlap between the following 
provisions related to the admissibility of confessions made in police custody during trial: 
TADA § 15 and POTA § 32. 
33 POTA, supra note 31, § 1(6). 
34 Nitya Ramakrishnan, Godhra: The Verdict Analysed, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL 
WKLY., Apr. 09, 2011. 
35 The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, No. 37, Act of Parliament, 1967 
(India) was amended by the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Amendment Act  (No. 35 of 
CHOPRA (DO NOT DELETE) 3/31/2016  8:52 AM 
10 OREGON REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 17, 1 
This amendment inserted into the UAPA many provisions from POTA 
and TADA, with some addition, alteration, and dilution.36 Parliament 
also passed the National Investigation Agency Act,37 creating a federal 
agency that can investigate and prosecute terror related crime across 
the country without permission from the governments of individual 
states. 
E. Expansion and Entrenchment 
The remit of security laws—regulating dangers deemed 
exceptional—suggests that there would be very few security laws that 
would focus on narrow dangers and apply at times when these narrowly 
defined dangers are acute. In fact, multiple such laws have been enacted 
since India became independent in 1947. The Indian state has added 
different types of laws to its national security armory over time, from 
preventive detention laws to laws authorizing domestic use of the 
military to anti-terrorism laws. While the types of laws have expanded, 
the content of laws falling within any particular category has remained 
quite consistent. 
Amendments to the UAPA in 2008 are a recent reminder that the 
core content of security legislation in India has been relatively stable, 
despite multiple repeals, amendments, and new laws. In 1985, POTA 
adopted the framework for proscribing organizations in the original 
UAPA 1967, but redesigned it to apply specifically to “terrorist 
organizations.”38 After TADA was repealed, most of TADA’s 
provisions were incorporated into POTA. The amended UAPA, in turn, 
incorporates many provisions of POTA, even though POTA itself has 
been repealed; the amended Act contains powers to regulate “unlawful” 
organizations as well as powers to regulate “terrorist” organizations.39 
 
2008) (India), which was passed on 31 December 2008, soon after the terrorist attacks in 
Mumbai on November 26, 2008. 
36 For a critical analysis of the 2008 amendments to the UAPA, see SOUTH ASIA HUMAN 
RIGHTS DOCUMENTATION CENTRE, REPEATING THE MISTAKES OF THE PAST (South Asia 
Human Rights Documentation Centre 2009), http://www.hrdc.net/sahrdc 
/hrfeatures/HRF191.htm#ftn5; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, BACK TO THE FUTURE: INDIA’S 
2008 COUNTERTERRORISM LAWS (2010). For a more favorable view of the UAPA, see 
Chandrika M. Kelso et al., Unlawful Activities Prevention Act-UAPA (India) & U.S.-Patriot 
Act (USA): A Comparative Analysis, 5 HOMELAND SECURITY REV. 2, 121 (2011). 
37 National Investigation Agency Act, No. 75 of 2008, INDIA CODE (2008), §§ 11–21, 
http://indiacode.nic.in [hereinafter NIAA]. 
38 POTA, supra note 31, §§ 18–22. 
39 UAPA, supra note 23, §§ 2(1)(l) and 2(1)(m) (defining a terrorist organization and a 
terrorist gang) and UAPA Chapter VI on terrorist organizations (Chapter VI, comprising 
CHOPRA (DO NOT DELETE) 3/31/2016  8:52 AM 
2015] National Security Laws in India: 11 
The Unraveling of Constitutional Constraints 
The trajectory of anti-terrorism legislation echoes that of preventive 
detention legislation. The PDA of 1950 was substantially replicated in 
MISA in 1971. Despite MISA’s notoriety, the NSA of 1980 
incorporated similar, and many identical, provisions on preventive 
detention. 
However, while newer laws incorporate content from repealed laws, 
this resuscitated content has become more firmly entrenched over time 
as sunset clauses in earlier laws have been discarded in subsequent 
legislation. The Preventive Detention Act of 1950 required annual 
review and renewal by Parliament. The National Security Act of 1980, 
which remains in force, does not have a sunset clause at all. TADA 
acknowledged its singularity by providing that Parliament would 
review it every two years. POTA provided for less frequent review but 
retained a sunset clause nevertheless. Unlike TADA and POTA, the 
UAPA has no sunset clause,40 and therefore provides a particularly 
secure harbor for expansive executive powers to ban and limit 
organizations. 
II 
THE EXECUTIVE’S EXTRAORDINARY NATIONAL SECURITY 
POWERS 
Thus, we see particular mechanisms and methods, and the attendant 
executive powers, being relayed from older laws to newer ones. Since 
the content of security laws has been relatively stable, it is possible to 
identify particular, recurring features in these laws that enhance the 
executive’s powers. I discuss these features below. I draw primarily 
upon the following laws currently in force: the Armed Forces (Special 
Powers) Act, the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (as amended in 
2008), and the National Security Act. I also draw upon preventive 
detention and anti-terrorism laws such as the PDA, MISA, TADA, and 
POTA that have now been repealed. I do not discuss in detail the 
provisions of all these laws but concentrate instead on characteristics I 
consider distinctive. 
 
sections 35 to 40, empowers the Indian government to designate an organization as 
“terrorist” and include it in a schedule of terrorist organizations, prescribes a procedure to 
review this designation, and creates criminal offenses related to belonging to, supporting or 
fundraising for a terrorist organization). 
40 SOUTH ASIA HUMAN RIGHTS DOCUMENTATION CENTRE, supra note 27. 
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A. Ambiguous Scope 
Indian security laws aim to preserve, inter alia, national security, 
public order, public peace, and religious harmony. Past and current 
laws have tended to treat the meaning of their stated bedrock goals as 
self-evident, and failed to demarcate the scope or limits of these goals. 
The NSA, for example, allows the central and state governments to 
detain an individual where this is considered necessary to prevent that 
person “acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State or 
from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public 
order.”41 The Act defines neither “State security” nor “public order,” 
nor which actions may be prejudicial to either. It is difficult to discern 
the boundaries of such a sweeping provision that potentially catches a 
large swath of speech and writing that criticizes the government. 
In addition to being vague, the scope of offenses under anti-terrorism 
laws is very broad. The UAPA, when it was amended in 2004 and 2008, 
incorporated wide and ambiguous definitions. The amended UAPA 
creates the offense of “committing a terrorist act,” and includes within 
the ambit of “terrorist acts” using force against a public official, using 
force against any individual in order to pressure the government, using 
violent means to kill, damage to property, or to “disrupt” “any supplies 
or services essential to the life of the community in India or in any 
foreign country.”42 Experts advise limiting the definition of terrorism 
to intentionally causing death or injury with the motive of intimidating 
the general public or pressuring a government or international body to 
act in particular ways.43 Contrary to this view, the UAPA chooses to 
include not just death and injury, but also property damage and 
disruption of supplies, not just within India but in other countries too. 
While the actus reus of this offense is broad, it is the mens rea that 
makes the limits of the offense difficult to fathom. Someone 
committing a “terrorist act” must intend to “threaten the unity, 
integrity, security or sovereignty of India” or “strike terror in people” 
in India or “in any foreign country.”44 However, it is also enough if an 
 
41 NSA, supra note 17, § 3(2). 
42 UAPA, supra note 23, § 15. 
43 Kent Roach, Defining Terrorism: The Need for a Restrained Definition, in THE 
HUMAN RIGHTS OF ANTI-TERRORISM 97–127 (Nicole LaViolette & Craig Forcese eds., 
2008); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 36, at 5; UN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, 
REPORT OF THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON THE PROMOTION AND PROTECTION OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS WHILE COUNTERING TERRORISM, MARTIN 
SCHEININ, E/CN.4/2006/98, Dec. 28, 2005. 
44 UAPA, supra note 23, § 15. 
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individual’s actions are “likely to” have these same effects.45 The 
language of the Act leaves entirely unclear whether an individual needs 
to know about or be reckless as to likely consequences, and could be 
read as creating a strict liability offense. 
In a state law promulgated recently, we see a similar lack of clarity. 
The Chhattisgarh Special Public Security Act of 200546 gives the 
Chhattisgarh government power to ban and prosecute organizations 
committing “unlawful activities.” Unlawful activities are not restricted 
to actions that are offenses under existing criminal law. They include 
speech or actions that, inter alia, “constitute a danger or menace to 
public order, peace and tranquility”47 or “encourage or preach 
disobedience to established law and its institutions”48 or “interferes or 
tends to interfere with the administration of law.”49 These provisions 
gratuitously use synonyms (“danger or menace”) and lower the 
threshold that tips something into being unlawful (“interferes or tends 
to interfere [emphasis added]”). 
Widely drafted provisions render potentially criminal many types of 
peaceful speech and activity that are critical of the government of the 
day or challenge nationalist views on history and politics. This allows 
the executive generous latitude to decide which actions technically 
falling within the ambit of a widely drafted offense it will actually 
prosecute. Individuals subject to these laws cannot confidently 
calibrate how to comply with loosely defined standards. By the same 
token, it is difficult to challenge an executive decision as being outside 
the scope of the executive’s statutory authority under a particular legal 
provision if that provision is so widely drafted that its boundaries are 
difficult to determine. 
B. Special Security Measures in Demarcated Zones 
The Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act (AFSPA) allows national 
and state governments to designate parts of India as “disturbed.” Once 
an area is declared “disturbed,” AFSPA authorizes the military to use 
force in that area far in excess of what ordinary criminal law authorizes, 
 
45 UAPA, supra note 23, § 15 (emphasis added). 
46 Chhattisgarh Special Public Security Act, 2006, No. 14, Acts of Parliament, 2006 
[hereinafter CSPSA]. 
47 Id. § 2(e)(i). 
48 Id. § 2(e)(vi). 
49 Id. § 2(e)(iii). 
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without being invited to do so by the civil administration.50 AFSPA 
also lowers the threshold for using lethal force on citizens, forgoing any 
requirement that force should be proportionate to the threat at hand.51 
It also dispenses with limits on holding people in pretrial custody.52 
The declaratory mechanism first seen in AFSPA has since been 
included in other laws. The now repealed Terrorist Affected Areas 
(Special Courts) Act 1984 allowed the national government to 
designate parts of the country as “terrorist affected,” which triggered 
special criminal procedures in that area.53 A state law, the Jammu & 
Kashmir Public Safety Act of 197854 similarly allows the government 
of the northern state of Jammu and Kashmir to designate areas where 
the police have enhanced powers to stop, search, use force, and 
preventively detain individuals. 
In all these laws, current and past, the executive’s decision to 
designate an area as unusually dangerous or volatile is unconstrained 
by threshold conditions or even guiding criteria. For example, AFSPA 
requires only that the deciding authority be “of the opinion” that the 
area in question is “in such a disturbed or dangerous condition that the 
 
50 Section 3 of AFSPA allows the central government or the state government to declare 
the whole or any part of that state disturbed. Once such a declaration is in force, members 
of the armed forces have the power under Section 4 of AFSPA to arrest, search, use force 
against and seize property from persons living in the disturbed area, for the duration that the 
area has the official status of being disturbed. In any part of India other than an area declared 
“disturbed” under AFSPA, the armed forces’ role in maintaining public order is regulated 
by the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 130 of the Code allows senior 
civil servants within a district to ask the armed forces for assistance in controlling specific 
incidents of public disorder, only after civilian police efforts to control such disorder have 
been inadequate. However, the armed forces cannot act of their own volition—they can 
intervene only after specific order by the civilian administration at the district level. 
51 Section 4(a) of AFSPA provides that a member of the armed forces can, after giving 
“such due warning as he may consider necessary . . . fire upon or otherwise use force, even 
to the causing of death” against any person who is contravening a law or an executive order 
related to public gatherings of over 5 people or carrying weapons,” if he feels such force is 
needed to maintain public order. By contrast, section 130 of the CrPC, which regulates 
armed forces intervention to maintain public order in areas that are not declared “disturbed,” 
requires the armed forces to use “as little force, and do as little injury to person and property, 
as may be consistent with dispersing the [unlawful] assembly.” 
52 Section 5 of AFSPA requires the armed forces to hand an arrested person to the police 
“with the least possible delay,” but does not actually specify a limit on how long a person 
arrested by a soldier can be held in armed forces custody before being handed into police 
custody. 
53 Terrorist Affected Areas (Special Courts) Act, supra note 24, §§ 3–4. 
54 The Jammu & Kashmir Public Safety Act, No. 6 of 1978, (Jammu & Kashmir, India) 
[hereinafter JKPSA]. 
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use of armed forces in aid of civil power is necessary.”55 These spatial 
designations have serious consequences for individuals within the area 
so designated. Despite this, the decision maker is not required to 
publicize the reasons behind the decision, or justify it by reference to 
empirical conditions. The AFSPA did not even require that a 
declaration be time bound, but as will be discussed in Part IV below, 
the Indian Supreme Court read a time limit into the law. 
If the Indian government declared a part of India to be in a state of 
emergency under Article 356 of the Constitution, it would have to 
specify how long the emergency will last, and Parliament would review 
any declaration of emergency.56 By contrast, when an area is designated 
as “disturbed” under AFSPA, this need not be reviewed by central or 
state legislatures. Such declarations can be, and have been, renewed by 
the executive repeatedly, effectively persisting for years at a stretch.57 
As a result, some human rights groups have argued that laws like the 
AFSPA allow the Indian government to constrain rights in the way it 
could if it declared a constitutional emergency, while evading the 
constitutional checks that regulate a decision of such gravity.58 
Spatially limited laws also have the potential to reinforce or validate 
racial and ethnic prejudice against those who live in “disturbed” parts 
of the country. They can map easily on to regional or religious 
differences between the majority of the country where they do not 
apply and the areas where they do. When an area is designated as 
“disturbed,” this might more easily allow law enforcement authorities 
to perceive its residents with a broad brush, conflating the peaceful 
majority with the minority of people who have adopted violent means 
for political ends. 
C. Preventive Detention Powers 
The Indian Constitution empowers national and state legislatures to 
enact preventive detention laws—one of the few democratic 
Constitutions to do so.59 Preventive detention laws can be passed not 
 
55 AFSPA, supra note 18, § 3. 
56 INDIA CONST. art. 356. 
57 AFSPA has applied to all or part of the states of Assam and Manipur since 1958. 
58 SOUTH ASIA HUMAN RIGHTS DOCUMENTATION CENTRE [hereinafter SAHRDC], 
ARMED FORCES SPECIAL POWERS ACT: A STUDY IN NATIONAL SECURITY TYRANNY 
(1995); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 36.  
59 SAHRDC argues that the Indian Constitution is the only constitution in a democratic 
country to expressly authorize preventive detention.  See SAHRDC, supra note 27, at 100. 
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only for national or state security, but also for maintaining public order 
or for maintaining “supplies and services essential to the community.”60 
An Indian citizen can be preventively detained not just because he is 
considered a threat to security or order, but also to prevent nonviolent 
crimes, such as hoarding supplies and fiscal crimes.61 
Individuals in preventive detention are not accorded the due process 
rights that the Indian Constitution recognizes for individuals arrested 
and tried under ordinary criminal law.62 Instead, the Constitution grants 
such individuals a limited, modified set of procedural rights. Preventive 
detention is subject to administrative review by an advisory board.63 
No one can be detained for more than three months unless the advisory 
board authorizes longer detention.64 The detainee must be told the 
grounds of detention “as soon as possible,” and be given “the earliest 
opportunity” to “make a representation,” i.e., to submit reasons he 
should not be detained.65 However, the Constitution does not set 
concrete deadlines within which a detainee must be told the grounds on 
which he is being detained or be allowed to challenge his detention. By 
contrast, someone arrested under the Criminal Procedure Code must be 
presented before a court within 24 hours, according to Article 22 of the 
Constitution.66 The government also has a large measure of discretion 
over what it will disclose to a detainee. Information the government 
considers “against the public interest” need not be disclosed.67 
Thus, the Constitution unambiguously renders legitimate detention 
that is not mediated by the rules of criminal procedure and evidence. 
 
60 INDIA CONST. List III, Entry 3. 
61 A number of other national and state laws create some measure of preventive detention 
powers. These include, inter alia, the Prevention of Blackmarketing and Maintenance of 
Supplies of Essential Commodities Act, 1980, the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and 
Prevention of Smuggling Act, 1974, the Orissa Prevention of Dangerous Activities of 
Communal Offenders Act, 1993; the Uttar Pradesh Gangsters and Anti-Social Activities 
(Prevention) Act 1996; the Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act 1999; the Andhra 
Pradesh Control of Organised Crime Act, 2001. 
62 Articles 22(1) and (2) of the Constitution provide that on arrest, an individual has the 
right to know “as soon as may be” the grounds for arrest. He has the right to consult and be 
represented by a lawyer of his choosing. The police must produce an arrested individual 
before a judicial magistrate within twenty-four hours of his arrest. Unless the magistrate 
orders longer detention, an arrested individual cannot be detained for more than twenty-four 
hours. See INDIA CONST. art. 22, §§ 1–2. 
63 INDIA CONST. art. 22, § 4. 
64 Id. § 5. 
65 Id. 
66 INDIA CONST. art. 22, § 2. 
67 INDIA CONST. art. 22, § 6. 
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National and state governments have not shied away from using this 
constitutional leeway. The Constitution sets the floor on preventive 
detention powers; it does not require full due process rights for 
detainees, but does not prohibit such rights either. However, the NSA, 
like MISA and the PDA before it, grants detainees only the bare bones 
procedural rights listed in the Constitution. Under current preventive 
detention laws, detainees are not entitled to disclosure of the evidence 
against them, access to legal representation, or a public hearing.68 
D. “Status Offenses” and the Power to Proscribe Organizations 
Traditionally, criminal law creates an offense by defining the actions 
that constitute the substance of the offense, and the state of mind that 
must accompany the act to render the actor culpable. Criminal liability 
rests upon the prosecution proving beyond reasonable doubt that an 
individual carried out the wrongful act with the necessary state of 
mind.69 Indian security laws, by contrast, create several “status 
offenses,” where criminal liability rests upon belonging to a formal or 
informal group with an agenda that is deemed a threat to public order 
or security. The UAPA allows the government to label groups as being 
“terrorist organizations” or “unlawful associations.”70 POTA, now 
repealed, similarly allowed the government to designate groups as 
“terrorist organizations.” The recent Chhattisgarh Special Public Safety 
Act also allows the state government to declare a group unlawful.71 The 
meanings of “terrorist” and “unlawful” have a wide and unclear scope 
under all these laws, extending, in the CSPSA as far as, inter alia, 
“encouraging . . . disobedience to established law and its institutions.”72 
These laws create “status offenses,” such that once a group is banned, 
membership in and of itself constitutes a crime. In addition, a host of 
direct and indirect dealings with a banned group are rendered criminal. 
For example, under the UAPA, membership in a terrorist organization 
or gang that is “involved in” a terrorist act can attract life imprisonment, 
 
68 NSA, supra note 17, § 8(2), 11; JKPSA, supra note 54, §§ 13, 16. 
69 Indian Evidence Act, Act No. 1 of 1872 (India) §§ 101–102 and CODE CRIM. PROC. § 
225–235. The standard of proof to prove a criminal offense under Indian law is beyond 
reasonable doubt. See, e.g., State of Kerala v Bahuleyam (1986) 3 CRIM. L.J. 1579 (1581). 
70 UAPA, supra note 23, § 3 (which empowers the national government to declare an 
organization unlawful) and § 35 (which empowers the national government to designate an 
organization as terrorist) of the UAPA. 
71 CSPSA, supra note 46, § 3. 
72 CSPSA, supra note 46, § 2(c)(vi). 
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regardless of whether the individual member was involved in any way 
with the terrorist act.73 
As Roach argues, status offenses such as these muddy the distinction 
between intelligence and evidence.74 Security agencies collect 
information about possible threats to security, and monitor suspicious 
individuals and groups in different ways. The quality of security 
intelligence is evaluated internally, but is not put to the test of cross-
examination, or criminal standards of proof. When intelligence is used 
as conclusive grounds for rendering an individual’s connection to a 
group criminal, the accused’s right to a fair hearing is compromised. 
Under the UAPA, associations are allowed administrative review of 
the government’s decision to label and ban them. However, the 
government need not disclose its grounds for a ban. In addition, groups 
designated as “terrorist organizations” cannot present new evidence or 
witnesses before the review board.75 The government need not wait for 
the results of administrative review; its declaration has immediate force 
and suspected members of terrorist organizations can be arrested and 
prosecuted before there is any finding on whether the government’s 
evidence for banning the group in question was adequate.76 
E. Enhanced Powers to Investigate and Prosecute 
Security laws such as the AFSPA and the UAPA enhance the state’s 
powers of search, seizure, and arrest. At the same time, the UAPA, like 
TADA and POTA before it, significantly diminishes the procedural 
rights of the accused as compared to the Criminal Procedure Code of 
1967. 
If we look at powers of search, seizure, and arrest, the UAPA allows 
“any officer of a Designated Authority” to search any person or 
property, and seize any property or arrest any person, where they have 
“reason to believe from personal knowledge or information given by 
any person and taken in writing . . . or from any document” or from 
“any other thing” that an offense has been committed.77 The Code of 
Criminal Procedure, by contrast, requires the police to have “credible 
 
73 UAPA, supra note 23, § 20. 
74 Kent Roach, The Eroding Distinction Between Intelligence and Evidence, in 
COUNTER-TERRORISM AND BEYOND: THE CULTURE OF LAW AND JUSTICE AFTER 9/11 48 
(Andrew Lynch et al. eds., 2010). 
75 UAPA, supra note 23, §§ 36(4), 37. 
76 UAPA, supra note 23, §§ 35–36. 
77 UAPA, supra note 23, § 43A. 
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information” or “reasonable suspicion” before arresting someone 
without a warrant.78 Similarly, the CrPC authorizes a search without a 
warrant only where a police officer has “reasonable grounds” to believe 
that something essential to an investigation could not be obtained in 
any other way without unreasonable delay.79 
Under ordinary law, an arrested person must be informed 
“forthwith” of the “full particulars of the [suspected] offense.”80 Under 
the UAPA’s lower standards, the police only have to inform an arrested 
person of the grounds of arrest “as soon as may be.”81 As Human Rights 
Watch points out, this would permit the police to keep arrested 
individuals in the dark, and limit their wherewithal to respond to the 
suspicions against them.82 
A person arrested under the CrPC cannot be held in custody for more 
than 24 hours without being charged of an offense.83 In sharp contrast, 
the UAPA, following POTA, allows suspects to be detained without 
charge for up to 180 days.84 Thirty days out of the permissible 180 can 
be in police custody, where the accused would be particularly 
vulnerable to torture and forced confessions.85 Courts can authorize the 
first ninety days of detention without any special grounds.86 To extend 
detention after ninety days, the prosecution needs to demonstrate only 
that investigation has made some progress.87 This extended pre charge 
detention has the potential to operate as de facto preventive detention. 
The amended UAPA, like its anti-terrorism forebears, TADA and 
POTA, shifts the law on bail. Traditionally, the law on bail rests on the 
principle that limiting a person’s liberty is a serious step88 Accordingly, 
until guilt has been proven, a judge will consider whether that 
individual’s liberty should be preserved, weighing in the balance the 
 
78 CODE CRIM. PROC. § 41 (1974). 
79 CODE CRIM. PROC. §§ 41, 165 (1974). 
80 CODE CRIM. PROC. § 50(1) (1974). 
81 UAPA, supra note 23, § 43B (inserted by Unlawful Activities (Prevention) 
Amendment Act, Act No. 35 of 2008 (India)), § 12. 
82 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 36, at 12. 
83 CODE CRIM. PROC. § 57 (1974). 
84 UAPA, supra note 23, § 43D(2). 
85 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 36, at 13. 
86 UAPA, supra note 23, § 43D(2). 
87 Id. 
88 See, e.g., Babu Singh v State of Uttar Pradesh (1978) 1 SCC 579 (India); State of 
Rajasthan v Balchand (1977) 4 SCC 308 (India). 
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possible risks of release.89 Bail is usually subject to conditions and 
limits, which are typically more onerous when the alleged offense is 
more serious or the potential risks of release relatively high.90 Under 
India’s anti-terrorism laws, however, rather than weighing the risk that 
the accused might commit an offense or abscond or intimidate 
witnesses if released, the court must consider whether there are 
reasonable grounds for believing that the accusations against the 
accused are prima facie true.91 The bail hearing becomes an abridged, 
premature trial, where the applicant is unlikely to meet the high 
threshold of disproving his guilt. His resulting remand in custody might 
indirectly prejudice his trial because it will be difficult for the trial 
judge to discount a colleague’s early assessment of guilt. 
Once trials are underway, these security laws also allow the court to 
presume guilt based upon certain kinds of inculpatory evidence, freeing 
the prosecution from demonstrating that the accused acted with the 
requisite criminal intent.92 The burden of proof shifts to the defense if, 
for example, the accused person’s fingerprints are found at the site of a 
terrorist offense or on “anything” used in connection with the offense, 
or if the accused person is found with arms or explosives that might 
have been used in a terrorist offense.93 TADA and POTA allowed 
confessions made to the police as evidence during trial, reversing the 
bar against using custodial confessions during trial imposed by the 
Indian Evidence Act,94 without explicitly barring statements extracted 
by threatening or inflicting torture.95 While the UAPA does not go quite 
as far as allowing courts to rely on confessions made in police custody, 
the various procedural departures that it does permit (including 
presumptions of guilt) considerably erode the right to a fair trial.96 
 
89 Id. 
90 See CODE CRIM. PROC. §§ 436–437(1)–(2) (Section 2 of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure divides offenses into those that are “bailable,” which are less serious, and those 
that are “non-bailable,” which are more serious. Section 436 of the Code provides a right to 
bail for persons accused of bailable offenses. Section 437 provides a right to bail 
compulsorily subject to conditions for persons accused of non-bailable offenses punishable 
with 7 years or more of imprisonment, but far more restrictive access to bail for persons 
abused of offenses punishable with death or life-imprisonment.). 
91 UAPA, supra note 23, § 43D(5). 
92 UAPA, supra note 23, § 43E. 
93 UAPA, supra note 23, § 43E. 
94 Indian Evidence Act, No. 1 of 1872, INDIA CODE (1872), § 25, http://indiacode.nic .in. 
95 POTA, supra note 31, § 32; TADA, supra note 25, § 15. 
96 Article 21 of the Constitution of India protects the right to life and liberty. The Supreme 
Court has read into the right to liberty the right to a fair trial (see, e.g., Police Commissioner, 
Delhi v. Registrar Delhi High Court, (1996) 6 SCC 323 (India)), the right to fair procedure 
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F. Power to Create Special Courts 
These disadvantages faced by the defense are compounded by the 
fact that trials under anti-terrorism laws are held in special courts. 
TADA and POTA gave central and state governments the power to 
establish special courts to try offenses under these acts.97 The National 
Investigation Agency Act of 2008 similarly authorizes the creation of 
special courts to try a range of security offenses including, inter alia, 
offenses under the UAPA.98 India’s constitution gives the high court of 
each state the authority to regulate trial courts.99 Where special courts 
are concerned, however, security laws oust the High Court’s 
supervisory powers and vest the executive with authority to appoint 
judges and determine the jurisdiction of special courts.100 Experience 
indicates that since special courts for security offenses were first 
established in 1984, governments have tended to choose judges who 
favor the prosecution.101 
In special courts, procedural rules are modified to dilute the rights 
of the defense. The NIAA, like POTA before it, empowers special 
courts to hold proceedings “at any place” when it is “expedient or 
desirable” to do so.102 This could mean, for example, holding court 
hearings inside a prison facility, which might intimidate the defendant. 
Such proceedings are open in theory but effectively hidden from view. 
Special courts are also empowered if they “so desire”103 to hold closed, 
or in camera, proceedings. The NIAA even allows a special court to try 
 
(see Maneka Gandhi v. India, (1978) 1 SCC 248 (India)), and the right to natural justice 
(see, e.g., Sunil Batra v. Delhi, (1978) 4 SCC 494 (India)). The Supreme Court has also 
clarified that Article 21 protects particular elements of a fair trial, such as the right to a 
public trial (see Vineet Narain v. India, (1998) 1 SCC 266 (India)), the right to a speedy trial 
(see Hussainara Khatoon v. Bihar, (1980) 1 SCC 81 (India)), and the right to legal aid in 
criminal proceedings (see Hussainara Khatoon v. Bihar, (1980) 1 SCC 108 (India)). Article 
20 of the Constitution of India recognizes the right against self-incrimination, the right 
against conviction for a retroactive offense, and the right against double jeopardy. Article 
22 of the Constitution of India recognizes certain procedural rights for an individual under 
arrest. In addition, India is party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (ICCPR), which recognizes the right to a fair trial and fair 
procedures in Articles 14, 15, and 16. 
97 POTA, supra note 31, § 23; TADA, supra note 25, § 9. 
98 NIAA, supra note 37,  §§ 11–21. 
99 INDIA CONST. art. 235. 
100 NIAA, supra note 37, § 11. 
101 Kalhan, et al., supra note 12, at 165. 
102 NIAA, supra note 37, § 12. 
103 NIAA, supra note 37, § 17(1). 
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the accused in his absence “if it thinks fit,” something that the Code of 
Criminal Procedure does not allow.104 
Judicial powers such as these that result, formally or informally, in 
closed trials are troubling given the executive’s strong role in 
appointing judges to special courts. Concealed proceedings are 
particularly worrisome in relation to the politically freighted crimes 
that are tried in special courts, as fears about terrorism might make the 
prosecution and the court more prone to miscarriages of justice. 
G. Limits on Judicial Review 
Clearly, Indian security laws give the executive large doses of 
discretionary power. They compound this by simultaneously restricting 
judicial review over these expansive powers. These laws are designed 
so that they assign decision-making authority to government officials 
at a certain level of seniority, but do not specify any criteria for decision 
making. As long as the decision maker is of the right rank, his or her 
subjective satisfaction on the issue at hand suffices. For example, as 
discussed above, a declaration under AFSPA that an area is “disturbed” 
cannot be substantively reviewed, unless it can be shown that the 
central or state government made the decision in bad faith and was not 
genuinely “of the opinion” that civil authority needed to be 
supplemented with military force.105 Similarly, the decision to 
preventively detain someone without charge cannot be reviewed on 
substance. The NSA only allows judicial review on whether the 
decision maker complied with the necessary procedure.106 
Not only is the scope of judicial review limited to procedural 
questions, some security laws set up administrative review 
mechanisms that an applicant must traverse before approaching the 
courts for judicial review. Administrative review under older security 
 
104 NIAA, supra note 37, § 16 (5); POTA, supra note 31, §§ 29(5), 30. 
105 AFSPA, supra note 18, § 3. Requires only that the central government or the relevant 
state government be “of the opinion” that an area is “disturbed” to an extent that requires 
the involvement of the armed forces. Since this provision does not lay down any criteria for 
forming such an opinion, courts are limited to checking whether the government’s opinion 
was put on record in the appropriate way. 
106 NSA, supra note 17, § 3. Allows governments to preventively detain an individual if 
“satisfied” that it is necessary to detain that individual to prevent him or her from acting “in 
any manner” prejudicial to, inter alia, national security or public order. Since the NSA, like 
AFSPA, does not lay down any criteria for concluding someone threatens security or order, 
courts are restricted to reviewing whether the decision to preventively detain was 
procedurally appropriate. For a discussion of this “subjective satisfaction” standard affects 
judicial review, see Jinks, supra note 13, at 331–34. 
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laws, including the NSA and the UAPA, is designed to oversee each 
decision the government makes on a particular issue. For example, 
every preventive detention order under the NSA has to be placed before 
an advisory board that confirms the order or recommends revocation.107 
Similarly, every declaration under the UAPA that an organization is 
“unlawful” must be placed before a review committee.108 Laws passed 
after 1980 adopt a different mechanism, under which an individual or 
organization can challenge a decision before the administrative review 
body, but the executive is not obliged to submit its decisions for review 
as a matter of course. For example, when an organization was declared 
a “terrorist organization” under POTA, or is declared as such under the 
UAPA, that declaration could be challenged before a review 
committee.109 But, the burden is on the affected individual or group to 
initiate review. Thus, more recent laws have diluted the scrutiny 
provided by administrative review, while preserving the hurdle it 
creates for an applicant seeking judicial review. 
Administrative review proceedings are weighted against the 
applicant. Proceedings before all these administrative bodies are closed 
to the public.110 Preventive detention laws expressly bar the detainee 
from having legal representation.111 Furthermore, the relevant 
government has the discretion to withhold information from affected 
parties on the reasons for the order against them. None of the current 
administrative review mechanisms provide for amicus curiae or special 
legal counsel who have security clearance to review classified evidence 
and advise on its strengths and weaknesses. 
These attenuated procedural rights are accompanied by limits on the 
independence of administrative review mechanisms. The government 
of the day appoints members to sit on these bodies.112 While the 
chairperson of an advisory boards under the NSA and review 
committee under the UAPA has to be a retired or sitting judge of the 
 
107 NSA, supra note 17, § 10. 
108 UAPA, supra note 23, § 4. 
109 See UAPA, supra note 23, § 36. Allows organizations that are designated as terrorist 
to apply for administrative review of this decision, and UAPA, supra note 23, § 37 requires 
the central government to established a review committee to hear this kind of challenge, but 
the UAPA does not requires that every decision designating an organization as terrorist be 
reviewed as a matter of course. 
110 NSA, supra note 17, § 11(4). 
111 NSA, supra note 17, § 11(4). 
112 NSA, supra note 17, § 9; UAPA, supra note 23, §§ 5, 37. 
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High Court,113 there are no statutory guidelines for choosing other 
members. Under current laws, review mechanisms are not “standing” 
bodies—the government has the option of creating them as needed.114 
The inherent conflict in the Ministry of Home Affairs appointing the 
committee that reviews its decisions only becomes deeper when such a 
committee is appointed ad hoc to review a specific decision. 
Decisions by the administrative review bodies bind the government. 
But government orders on preventive detention or proscribing 
organizations take effect immediately and remain effective until and 
unless the review committee disagrees with the government.115 
Detainees or banned organizations can turn to the High Court if 
administrative review goes against them, as it generally does116 
However, it is worth noting that the relevant laws themselves do not 
grant the High Court appellate jurisdiction over administrative review 
decisions. Jurisdiction flows instead from the Court’s constitutional 
power (and duty) to hear citizens’ petitions seeking to enforce 
fundamental rights.117 In order to petition the courts, the applicant has 
to demonstrate a prima facie violation of a constitutional right. 
III 
CONSEQUENCES OF SECURITY LAWS: EXCESS, OVERLAP, AND 
ABUSE 
Some observers argue that ordinary criminal law, in the form of the 
Criminal Procedure Code and Indian Penal Code, gives governments 
 
113 NSA, supra note 17, § 9(3); UAPA, supra note 23, § 37(3). 
114 See NSA, supra note 17, § 9(1) (empowering the Central Government and each state 
government to constitute an advisory board “whenever necessary”). See also UAPA, supra 
note 23, § 5(1) (similarly empowering central and state governments to constitute an 
administrative tribunal “as and when necessary”). 
115 See NSA, supra note 17, § 10. Requires that detention orders be placed before a 
review committee within three weeks of the person actually being detained, rather than 
before a person is detained. 
116 See, e.g., AMNESTY INT’L, A ‘LAWLESS’ LAW: DETENTIONS UNDER THE JAMMU & 
KASHMIR PUBLIC SAFETY ACT (Amnesty Int’l, 2011), at 18–19; Niloufer Bhagwat, 
Institutionalising Detention without Trial, 13(11) ECON. & POL. WKLY. 512 (1978). Since 
the administrative review boards can only review whether the government’s decision was 
made using the appropriate procedure, rather than whether the decision was substantively 
sound, it is rare for a decision to be overturned. 
117 See INDIA CONST. art. 32. Grants citizens the right to approach the Supreme Court for 
enforcement of fundamental rights recognized in the Constitution and empowers the 
Supreme Court, in turn, to grant a range of remedies to enforce such rights. See also INDIA 
CONST. art. 226, § 1. Similarly empowers state High Courts to issue directions, orders, and 
writs within its jurisdiction. 
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adequate tools to control and prosecute terrorist and separatist 
violence,118 and that special security legislation is unnecessary. This 
counterfactual stance is difficult to evaluate, given that security laws 
have been a consistent part of independent India’s legal landscape, with 
new security laws drawing heavily upon their predecessors. We can, 
however, trace the consequences of security laws. As discussed in Part 
II above, India’s security laws enlarge the executive’s power to use 
force, detain, investigate, arrest, and try individuals. These procedural 
powers rest upon loosely drafted criteria, and accompany sprawling 
substantive offenses of indeterminate scope. Laws are designed to 
shield government actors from criminal or civil suit, and to dilute 
judicial review. Below, I discuss in more detail the consequences that 
flow from the distinctive features that have been reproduced in 
successive generations of security laws. 
A. Human Rights Abuses 
Human rights groups argue that India’s security laws are 
incompatible with international human rights law and the Indian 
Constitution.119 They point out that security laws currently in force 
place excessive, unnecessary restrictions on the rights to a fair trial, 
freedom of association, freedom of speech, and freedom of movement, 
as guaranteed by the International Convention on Civil and Political 
Rights, to which India is a party.120 They also argue that AFSPA, which 
bestows generous “shoot-to-kill” powers on the military in “disturbed” 
areas, disproportionately restricts the right to life.121 
Expansive executive discretion created by legal provisions that fall 
far short of human rights standards creates ample room for abuse of 
power. Over the years, journalists, academics, and human rights groups 
have documented a multitude of serious human rights abuses 
committed by state functionaries using powers granted by security 
 
118 SAHRDC, supra note 30, at 17–19. 
119 See, e.g., SAHRDC, supra note 58; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 36; HUMAN 
RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 19; AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 116; PEOPLE’S UNION OF 
DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS, NOT ANOTHER TERRORIST LAW PLEASE: A CRITIQUE OF THE 
PROPOSED CRIMINAL LAW AMENDMENT BILL (People’s Union of Democratic Rights, 
2000); PEOPLE’S UNION OF DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS, THROUGH THE LENS OF NATIONAL 
SECURITY (People’s Union of Democratic Rights, 2008); PEOPLE’S UNION OF 
DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS, THE TERROR OF LAW: UAPA AND THE MYTH OF NATIONAL 
SECURITY (People’s Union of Democratic Rights, 2012). 
120 SAHRDC, supra note 58; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 19. 
121 SAHRDC, supra note 58; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 19, at 6. 
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laws. Credible accounts abound of torture in custody and coerced 
confessions.122 Defendants charged with crimes under TADA and 
POTA have received unfair trials.123 The military has used gravely, 
often fatal, disproportionate force against civilians in “disturbed” areas 
under the Armed Forces Special Powers Act.124 Arbitrary detention and 
extrajudicial execution are frequent, and persist despite criticism from 
United Nations human rights mechanisms.125 A recent petition before 
the Supreme Court claimed that, in one small northeastern state alone, 
an estimated 1528 people have been extrajudicially killed by security 
forces since May 1979.126 Women have faced sexual violence from 
state actors using security powers, particularly in areas where the 
military has powers under AFSPA,127 but also in other Indian states 
 
122 See, e.g., Asian Ctr. for Human Rights, Need for a National Law for Prevention of 
Torture (June 25, 2007), http://www.achrweb.org/ncpt/ncpt0107.pdf; Asian Centre for 
Human Rights, Torture in India 2011 (Nov. 21, 2011), http://www.achrweb.org/reports 
/india/torture2011.pdf. 
123 AMNESTY INT’L, THE TERRORIST AND DISRUPTIVE ACTIVITIES (PREVENTION) ACT: 
THE LACK OF “SCRUPULOUS CARE” (Amnesty Int’l, 1994); PEOPLE’S UNION OF 
DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS, TRIAL OF ERRORS: A CRITIQUE OF THE POTA COURT JUDGMENT 
ON THE 13 DECEMBER CASE (People’s Union of Democratic Rights, 2003); PEOPLE’S 
UNION OF DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS, JUDICIAL TERROR: DEATH PENALTY, TADA AND THE 
RAJIV GANDHI ASSASSINATION CASE (People’s Union of Democratic Rights, 1998); 
SAHRDC, supra note 27. 
124 See CIVIL SOCIETY COALITION ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN MANIPUR AND THE UN, 
MANIPUR: A MEMORANDUM OF EXTRAJUDICIAL, ARBITRARY OR SUMMARY EXECUTIONS 
(2012) (submitted to Christof Heyns, United Nations Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, 
summary, or arbitrary executions). 
125 CIVIL SOCIETY COALITION ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN MANIPUR AND THE UN, supra note 
124; Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Human Rights 
Council, Report on mission to India, U.N. Doc A/HRC/23/47/Add.1 (Apr. 26, 2013) (by 
Christof Heyns); Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders, Report 
on Mission to India (Jan. 21, 2012), Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc Mission to India 
A/HRC/19/55/Add.1 (Feb. 6, 2012) (by Margaret Sekaggya); Dolly Kikon, The 
Predicament of Justice: Fifty Years of Armed Forces Special Powers Act in India, 17 
CONTEMP. S. ASIA 271 (2009). 
126 Extra-judicial Execution Victim Families Association (EEVFAM) v India, 2013 (2) 
SCC (India); Extra-judicial Execution Victim Families Association (EEVFAM) v India, 
Writ Petition (Crim) No. 129 of 2012 (on file with author); Meenakshi Ganguly, 
Extrajudicial Killings Corrode Democracy in India, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2013, 
http://india.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/07/15/extrajudicial-killings-corrode-democracy-in      -
india/; Sandeep Joshi, Court-appointed Panel Highlights Misuse of AFSPA in Manipur, THE 
HINDU, July 17, 2013, http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/other-states/court 
appointed-panel-highlights-misuse-of-afspa-in-manipur/article4921637.ece. 
127 MANDY TURNER & BINALAKSHMI NEPRAM, THE IMPACT OF ARMED VIOLENCE IN 
NORTHEAST INDIA (Univ. of Bradford 2004); Namrata Gaikwad, Revolting bodies, 
hysterical state: Women protesting the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (1958), 17 
Contemp. S. ASIA 299 (2009); Surabhi Chopra, Dealing with Dangerous Women: Sexual 
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such as Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh128 Gendered violence against 
women by the police and military is often neglected, but the limited 
documentation that exists should cause serious disquiet.129 A less 
visible effect of such laws is on the families of individuals who are 
detained or prosecuted. Past experience has shown that trials can last a 
long time, as can preventive detention, with detention orders being 
renewed year after year. Families of detainees and defendants lose an 
earning member, while having to defray lawyers’ fees and navigate the 
legal system. This would strain most families, but be potentially 
ruinous for those who are poor. 
B. Insulation from Accountability 
It is highly likely that we do not have the full measure of abuses 
committed by government actors or agents using security laws. 
Enhanced powers to detain and interrogate are, by their nature, wielded 
behind closed doors. Targets of torture and inhumane treatment in 
custody might conceal abuse entirely. Victims of sexual violence in 
custody—both men and women—might hide such abuse. Affected 
individuals might speak out within their families, wider communities, 
or to civil society groups, but may not be willing to file a formal 
complaint. This is particularly likely in remote areas where the official 
who would investigate the complaint might work closely with the 
officials who are the subject of the complaint. Individuals willing to 
seek redress have to persuade the police and prosecution to pursue their 
complaint, who in turn need special permission from the central 
 
Assault Under Cover of National Security Laws in India, 34(2) B.U. INTL. L.J. (forthcoming 
2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id =2654538. 
128 Chopra, supra note 127. 
129 Id. 
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government to press criminal charges.130 The limited information 
available suggests that permission has rarely been granted.131 
Even where victims would like to seek redress, they may not know 
that the government’s actions can be formally challenged, or how to 
pursue such a challenge, because it requires more than a complaint to 
the police. As an example, AFSPA has applied to Assam and 
Manipur continuously since 1958, and to the other five northeastern 
states since 1972, but there are very few reported habeas corpus cases 
in the relevant High Court until 1981, after which the High Court was 
petitioned more frequently by individuals alleging arbitrary detention, 
torture, or the unlawful killing of a loved one.132 It is possible that 
abuses by the armed forces were rare in the first two decades of 
 
130 CODE CRIM. PROC. § 197. Provides that government officials belonging to a 
government service administered by Central Government cannot be criminally prosecuted 
unless the Ministry of Home Affairs permits such prosecution. Id. § 45. Members of the 
armed forces are shielded from arrest for actions performed as a part of their official duties. 
AFSPA, supra note 18, § 6. Bars any legal proceedings, criminal or civil, against members 
of the armed forces without prior permission from the Central Government. For a discussion 
of jurisprudence on CODE CRIM. PROC. § 197, see Surabhi Chopra, Holding Public Officials 
Accountable, in ON THEIR WATCH: MASS VIOLENCE AND STATE APATHY IN INDIA–
EXAMINING THE RECORD (Surabhi Chopra & Prita Jha eds., Three Essays Collective 2014) 
at 298–301. For critical commentary on CODE CRIM. PROC. § 197, see Tarunabh Khaitan, 
Parties Should Be Asked to Repeal Impunity Provisions, THE HINDU, 2009, 
http://www.hindu.com/2009/03/23/stories/2009032351230900.htm. 
131 There are no publicly available statistics on the number of applications for permission 
to prosecute government officials, civil or military. A report by SAHRDC on AFSPA states 
that, as of 1995, no individual from the northeast states had applied for permission to file a 
civil suit or writ petition against the armed forces. See SAHRDC, supra note 58. A research 
study that used India’s Right to Information Act of 2005 to seek information about 
applications and permission to prosecute under CODE CRIM. PROC. § 197 in relation to mass 
violence recorded that the Ministry of Home Affairs refused multiple requests to disclose 
the information requested. See Chopra, supra note 130. 
132 There is no comprehensive review of writ petitions by individuals challenging abuses 
by the armed forces in states where AFSPA applies. However, published judicial decisions 
suggest that such petitions began to appear in the early 1980s, increased in frequency in the 
1990s and continue to be used by individuals in states where AFSPA applies. India’s 
northeastern states (where AFSPA applies) come under the jurisdiction of the Gauhati High 
Court. Legal databases indicate that the Gauhati High Court made final decisions in response 
to one writ petition about AFSPA-related abuse in 1982 (Basi Singh v. State of Assam & 
Ors., 1982 CRIM. L.J. 229), one in 1983 (Naosam Ningol Chandam Ongbi Nungshitombi 
Devi v. Rishang Keishing, Chief Minister of Manipur and Ors., 1983 CRIM L.J. 574), five 
such petitions between 1984 and 1989, eighteen petitions between 1990 and 1999, and 
seventeen petitions between 2000 and 2013. It is worth noting firstly that High Court 
decisions are not comprehensively reported, and secondly that these numbers reflect final 
disposal by the court, not the number of petitions filed by individuals. Nevertheless, these 
numbers suggest that individuals began actively petitioning courts after suffering abuse in 
the 1980s and did so in greater numbers from the early 1990s onwards. 
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AFSPA’s existence. But it is also quite likely that victims of abuse 
simply lacked the information and experience to seek redress. 
C. Discriminatory and Partisan Use of the Law 
The Indian experience so far suggests that once security laws create 
expansive executive power, empowered governments are not cautious 
about using that power. In 1985, TADA gave every state in India the 
power to prosecute terrorist offenses in special courts. Over time, 
human rights groups documented that the highest number of TADA 
cases was registered not in states with a history of violent insurgency, 
but in Gujarat, a state that saw little terrorist or separatist activity during 
the time TADA was in force.133 As discussed in Part II, expansive 
security offenses potentially render criminal a wide sweep of 
nonviolent speech and activity that criticizes the government or 
challenges existing security policies, even though it does not on any 
reasonable assessment actually endanger public order or national 
security. 
Security laws have lent themselves to religious and ethnic 
discrimination. Singh traces how POTA prosecutions relied heavily 
upon religious profiling, and describes the Act as “creating suspect 
communities.”134 Individuals who are Muslim, Sikh, or from India’s 
northeastern states have been disproportionately investigated, detained 
and prosecuted under security laws.135 The government of Jharkhand 
used POTA very heavily in parts of the state that are poor and have a 
high proportion of people from tribal groups.136 Violent far left groups 
were active in these areas, but rather than targeted investigation, human 
rights reports record scatter shot violence, and wholesale arrest and 
detention of people from particular tribal communities.137 
Security laws have also been used by those in political office against 
opponents and critics. As mentioned in Part II, Indira Gandhi deployed 
 
133 SAHRDC, supra note 30, at 33. 
134 UJJWAL KUMAR SINGH, THE STATE, DEMOCRACY, AND ANTI-TERROR LAWS IN 
INDIA 165–219. (Routledge 2007). 
135 SAHRDC, supra note 27. 
136 SINGH, supra note 134, at 195–203. 
137 See, e.g., SABRANG COMMC’NS, PEOPLE’S TRIBUNAL ON THE PREVENTION OF 
TERRORISM ACT (POTA): BACKGROUND DOCUMENT (Sabrang Communications 2004) at 3 
and 20, http://www.sabrang.com/pota.pdf. See generally PREETI VERMA, THE TERROR OF 
POTA AND OTHER SEC. LEGISLATION: A REPORT ON THE PEOPLE’S TRIBUNAL ON THE 
PREVENTION OF TERRORISM ACT AND OTHER SEC. LEGISLATION (Sabrang Commc’ns 
2004). 
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MISA aggressively against political opponents during the Emergency. 
More recently, the Chief Minister of the state of Tamil Nadu used 
POTA against an uncooperative member of the state legislature, as did 
the Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh.138 In 2007, the UAPA was used to 
prosecute a senior member of a national civil liberties organization who 
criticized civilian militias organized by the state government of 
Chhattisgarh to counter insurgent groups.139 Media reports revealed 
that these individuals posed no threat to the nation, and publicized the 
state’s lack of cogent grounds for acting against them. However, in a 
technical sense, it is arguable that arrests and prosecution in these 
instances fell squarely within the ambit of widely defined POTA and 
UAPA offenses. While legal action against public figures has garnered 
headlines and drawn criticism, it illustrates the likelihood of similar 
action, free of media scrutiny, against individuals who are not 
politically influential. 
D. Security Laws as a Crutch and Cover 
Publicly available official statistics on security laws are scant. 
India’s National Crime Records Bureau used to report arrests and 
convictions under TADA annually, but has not released similar 
information related to POTA or the UAPA. The national government 
reports the number of individuals in preventive detention, but does not 
break this down by state, or report reasons why or for how long people 
have been detained.140 
The limited statistics that are available seem to validate 
documentation by human rights groups and journalists. The national 
government’s information suggests that security laws are used 
excessively, without due care and sufficient justification. Statistics 
reported by the government in October 1993 showed that since TADA 
came into force, central and state governments arrested and detained 
52,268 individuals under the law, but only 0.81 % of these individuals 
 
138 SINGH, supra note 134, at 220–60; Manoj Mate & Adnan Naseemullah, State Security 
and Elite Capture: The Implementation of Antiterrorist Legislation in India, 9 J.  HUM. RTS. 
262 (2010). 
139 See Frontline Defenders, Binayak Sen, http://www.frontlinedefenders.org/Binayak 
Sen (last visited Oct. 17, 2015). See also Malavika Vyawahare, A Conversation With: 
Human Rights Activist Binayak Sen, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2012). 
140 The National Crime Records Bureau, Ministry of Home Affairs reports the number 
of individuals in preventive detention on an annual basis. National Crime Records Bureau, 
https://ncrb.gov.in (last visited Oct. 17, 2015). 
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were eventually convicted of any offense.141 In Punjab, only 0.37 % of 
the 14,557 individuals detained under TADA had been convicted.142 
Central government figures from 1994 show that of 67,059 people 
detained under TADA since its enactment, only 8,000 people—less 
than 12% of those arrested and held in custody—were put on trial.143 
Of these 8000, 725 people—less than 1% of total TADA detainees—
were eventually convicted.144 
These statistics suggest that people arrested under TADA were held 
for long periods and eventually released without charge, or charged and 
tried, but acquitted after protracted trials. Low rates of indictment 
indicate arrests based on weak evidence and poor investigation. High 
rates of acquittal despite the pro-prosecution tilt of special courts, in 
turn, suggest trials founded on scant evidence and lackadaisical 
prosecution. It seems that security laws—even those that create 
criminal offenses—serve largely to preventively detain individuals and 
proscribe organizations based upon suspicion rather than proof to the 
criminal standard. Kalhan et al. point to structural weaknesses in 
India’s criminal justice system to explain this phenomenon.145 They 
argue that poorly trained police personnel and strained, inefficient 
courts cannot meet the actual demands of investigating and prosecuting 
serious crime; security laws help governments to paper over these 
weaknesses.146 
On this view, security laws have enduring appeal not because they 
make it easier to investigate and punish terrorist and separatist violence, 
but because they allow the state to pull individuals and groups out of 
circulation without having to prove wrongdoing beyond reasonable 
doubt. Security laws that create terrorist offenses and special courts add 
to the state’s preventive powers by allowing easier arrests and long 
periods on remand. In addition, overlap and intersections between 
preventive detention and anti-terror laws, as well as between security 
 
141 Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, Memorandum to the Full 
Commission of National Human Rights Commission, Annexure I, 19 December 1994, cited 
in RAM NARAYAN KUMAR, ET. AL., REDUCED TO ASHES: THE INSURGENCY AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS IN PUNJAB: FINAL REPORT: VOLUME I, 99 (South Asia Forum for Human Rights, 
2003). 
142 Id. at 99. 
143 SAHRDC, supra note 27, citing a statement by the Minister for Internal Security 
when speaking to the Press Trust of India on 28 August 1994. 
144 SAHRDC, supra note 27; RAM NARAYAN KUMAR ET. AL., supra note 141, at 100. 
145 Anil Kalhan, et al., supra note 12. 
146 Id. at 192–96. 
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law and ordinary criminal law, can be used in concert to further 
enhance the state’s preventive and procedural powers. For example, 
prosecutors can charge the same individual with crimes under security 
laws and under the IPC, and place evidence before the court that under 
ordinary evidential standards would be tainted or inadmissible.147 
Human rights reports as well as court decisions show that preventive 
detention laws are used to detain people before they are prosecuted for 
a crime, and detainees are arrested as criminal suspects as soon as they 
are released from administrative detention.148 
Thus, expansive security powers can, and evidently have, facilitated 
human rights abuses. The limited official data on criminal justice 
strongly indicates that security laws are used wantonly as a matter of 
course. In addition, the enhanced ability to arrest, detain, prosecute, and 
use force has allowed serious abuses by official actors to proliferate. 
Considerable room for maneuver, reproduced in one law after another, 
accompanied by official tolerance for the police, prosecution, and 
military abusing such power can shift institutional culture so that 
disproportionate force or harsh interrogation become routine rather 
than exceptional. The occupation of Oinam village, Manipur by 
paramilitaries in July 1987, is one of several infamous examples of 
extreme abuse.149 The Assam Rifles launched a combing operation in 
Oinam after a separatist group raided one of their posts, and over a 
period of four months were brutally violent towards residents of the 
village. The Assam Rifles hung people upside down, administered 
electric shocks, and buried people alive in order to extract information 
from them. Women were subjected to sexual assault and rape.150 The 
Rifles allegedly forced two women who went into labor to give birth in 
front of the soldiers.151 They used force not to control an actual or 
perceived threat, but to humiliate or subdue people subject to such 
force. While the events in Oinam in 1987 were particularly serious, 
they lie on a spectrum of state abuse aided by security powers, and 
 
147 See earlier discussion in Part II.E. 
148 AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 116, at 61–62. Several decisions by the High Court of 
Jammu & Kashmir on writ petitions challenging detention under the Jammu & Kashmir 
Preventive Detention Act reveal that petitioners were in prison on remand or on bail when 
an order of preventive detention was passed against them. See, e.g., Vijay Kumar v. Jammu 
& Kashmir (1981) AIR 1982 SC 1023 (India), Mohd. Iqbal Sheikh v. Jammu & Kashmir 
(2003) 3 J.K.J. 534 (India) and Zakir Hussain v Jammu & Kashmir (2006) 2 J.K.J. 672 
(India). 
149 MANDY TURNER & BINALAKSHMI NEPRAM, supra note 127, at 28–29. 
150 Manipur Baptist Convention and Anr. v Union of India, (1988) 1 G.L.R. 433 (India). 
151 MANDY TURNER & BINALAKSHMI NEPRAM, supra note 127, at 28–29. 
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remind us that security laws can render the individual citizen 
insecure.152 
IV 
EXECUTIVE-LED LEGISLATION, PARLIAMENTARY ENDORSEMENT 
By this point, there exists years’ worth of credible documentation 
demonstrating how sweeping security powers foster serious violations 
of human rights.153 However, the content of security laws has shifted 
little in response. In this Part, I show how India’s national legislature 
follows the executive’s lead on security legislation, and argue that the 
legislature’s repeated acquiescence flows both from institutional 
structure, as well as substantive agreement with the executive’s 
proposals. 
A. Structural Advantage 
India is a parliamentary democracy. The political party that wins the 
maximum number of parliamentary seats in periodic national elections 
forms the government. As a result, the government of the day has 
substantial sway over Parliament’s legislative agenda. While individual 
members of India’s legislature have frequently proposed bills, or draft 
laws, government bills have conventionally garnered greater time and 
priority in Parliament.154 Clearly, the government authoring a bill 
makes the first move in shaping the content of the resulting law. Bills 
proposed by the government typically secure a majority in Parliament, 
 
152 Asad challenges the “good versus evil” rhetoric that accompanies most national 
security measures, and argues that terrorist violence and the state’s use of force to prevent 
such violence share a kinship that emotive, moralized language can obscure. See Talal Asad, 
Thinking About Terrorism and Just war, 23 CAMBRIDGE REV. INT’L. AFF. 3 (2009); 
Donohue similarly reflects on the potential for counter-terror measures to mirror terrorist 
violence. She argues further that states blur the difference between their counter-terrorist 
actions and terrorist acts when such measures are violent, intended to induce fear, directed 
at a wider audience than the immediate physical target, and borne by people who are “non-
combatants.” See Laura Donohue, Terrorism and Counter-Terrorist Discourse, in GLOBAL 
ANTI-TERRORISM L. & POL’Y (V Ramraj et al. eds., 2005). 
153 See supra note 119. 
154 During the fourteenth Lok Sabha, or lower house, of Parliament, which lasted from 
17 May 2004 to 18 May 2009, 328 private members bills were introduced, but only 14 were 
discussed. During the thirteenth Lok Sabha, which lasted from 10 October 1999 to 6 
February 2004, 343 private members bills were introduced, but only 17 were discussed. PRS 
LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH, VITAL STATS: PRIVATE MEMBERS BILLS IN LOK SABHA, 
http://www.prsindia.org/parliamenttrack/vital-stats/private-members-bills-in-lok-sabha-20 
10-1011/ (last visited Oct. 2, 2013). 
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often aided by whips issued by the ruling party corralling its members 
to support the party’s position. The vast majority of bills passed by the 
Indian Parliament since it first began functioning have been 
government bills.155 Thus, India’s national government has an 
embedded structural advantage in shaping and passing legislation in 
general. 
B. Pressing Home the Executive’s Advantage 
Where security laws are concerned, this general structural advantage 
has been converted by the government into substantial control over the 
legislative process. To achieve this, the executive has used with a free 
hand constitutional powers that are meant to be used sparingly. 
Article 123 of the Constitution empowers the Indian President to 
pass ordinances, which have the same effect as laws passed by 
Parliament.156 The President can pass an ordinance when he or she 
perceives a critical need, and Parliament is not in session. The 
Constitution allows the President to legislate on any subject upon 
which the Indian Parliament could legislate, but balances this by 
insisting upon the soonest viable Parliamentary scrutiny. Accordingly, 
executive ordinances have to be placed before Parliament the next time 
it is in session, where they undergo the usual process of legislative 
review, debate, and voting157 
Most major national security laws in India were first passed as 
executive ordinances. The PDA was preceded by an executive 
ordinance in 1950, as was the original UAPA in 1967. Ordinances also 
preceded MISA, AFSPA, the NSA, the Terrorist Affected Areas 
(Special Courts) Act, TADA, POTA, and amendments to the UAPA in 
2004, i.e., all the laws discussed in Part I above.158 Interestingly, most 
 
155 Only 14 private members bills have been passed by the Indian Parliament since 1950. 
No private members bills have been passed since 1970. Table 33: Private Members Bills 
Passed by Parliament since 1952 so far. GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, STATISTICAL HANDBOOK, 
101 (Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs ed., June 27, 2012), http://mpa.nicin 
/Statbook12.pdf; PRS LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH, supra note 154. 
156 On ordinance making power under the Indian constitution and ways to limit it, see 
generally Shubhankar Dam, Constitutional Fiats: Presidential Legislation in India’s 
Parliamentary Democracy, 24 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 96 (2010). 
157 INDIA CONST. art. 123, § 2. 
158 See Preventive Detention (Amendment) Ordinance, 1950, No. 19, Central 
Ordinances, Ministry of Law, 1950 (India); Armed Forces (Assam-Manipur) Special 
Powers Ordinance, 1958, No. 26, Central Ordinances, Ministry of Law, 1958 (India); The 
Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Ordinance 1966, No. 6, Central Ordinances, Ministry of 
Law, 1966 (India); Maintenance of Internal Security Ordinance, 1971, No. 5, Central 
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of these ordinances were issued a few weeks—in many instances less 
than a month—after a session of Parliament ended, or a few weeks 
before a session began.159 On all these occasions, the national 
government could have placed a bill before Parliament, rather than 
introducing an executive ordinance, by acting just slightly faster or 
waiting slightly longer, which suggests that such executive measures 
were a strategic choice rather than an absolute necessity. 
The power to pass ordinances sits uneasily with the principle of 
separation of powers, which is enshrined in the Indian Constitution.160 
 
Ordinances,  Ministry of Law, 1971 (India); The National Security Ordinance, 1980, No. 
11, Central Ordinances,  Ministry of Law, 1980 (India); The Armed Forces (Punjab and 
Chandigarh) Special Powers Ordinance, 1983, No. 9, Central Ordinances,  Ministry of Law, 
1983 (India); The Terrorist Affected Areas (Special Courts) Ordinance, 1984, No. 9, Central 
Ordinances, Ministry of Law, 1984 (India); The Terrorist and Disruptive Activities 
(Prevention) Ordinance, 1987, No. 2, Central Ordinances,  Ministry of Law, 1987 (India); 
The Armed Forces (Jammu and Kashmir) Special Powers Ordinance, 1990, No. 3, Central 
Ordinances, Ministry of Law, 1990 (India); The Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance, 2001, 
No. 9, Central Ordinances, Ministry of Law, 2001 (India); The Prevention of Terrorism 
(Second) Ordinance, 2001, No. 12, Central Ordinances, Ministry of Law, 2001 (India); The 
Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Amendment Ordinance, 2004, No. 2, Central Ordinances, 
Ministry of Law, 2004 (India). 
159 The Armed Forces (Assam-Manipur) Special Powers Ordinance was passed on 22 
May 1958, 12 days after the preceding session of the lower house of Parliament, the Lok 
Sabha, ended on 10 May 1958. The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Ordinance, 1966 was 
passed on 17 June 1966, less than a month after the preceding session of the lower house of 
Parliament ended on 20 May 1966. The Maintenance of Internal Security Ordinance, 1971 
was passed on 7 May 1971, 17 days before the next session of the Lok Sabha began on 24 
May 1971. The National Security Ordinance, 1980 was passed on 22 September 1980, a few 
weeks after the preceding session of the Lok Sabha ended on 12 August 1980. The Terrorist 
Affected Areas (Special Courts) Ordinance, 1984 was passed on 14 July 1984, 9 days before 
the next session of the Lok Sabha began on 23 July 1984. The Terrorist and Disruptive 
Activities (Prevention) Amendment Ordinance, 1985 was passed on 5 June 1985, 15 days 
after the previous session of the Lok Sabha ended on 20 May 1985. The Prevention of 
Terrorism Ordinance, 2001 was passed on 24 October 2001, less than a month before the 
next session of the Lok Sabha began on 19 November 2001. The Prevention of Terrorism 
(Second) Ordinance, 2001 was passed on 30 December 2001, 9 days after the previous 
session of the Lok Sabha ended on 21 December 2001. The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) 
Amendment Ordinance, 2004 was passed on 21 September 2004, 3 weeks after the previous 
session of Parliament ended on 30 August 2004. 
160 India is a federal country with a parliamentary system of government. The national 
legislature or parliament is elected through periodic national elections based upon universal 
adult franchise, and the legislatures of India’s 29 states are similarly elected through periodic 
elections in each state. The political party or coalition with a majority in the legislature forms 
the government. Legislation proposed by the executive branch must secure a majority in the 
legislature to become law. India has an independent judiciary with the power to, inter alia, 
review laws and executive action and policies for compatibility with the constitution. See 
INDIA CONST. Part V, Chapters I and II for the structure and powers of the national executive 
and legislature; INDIA CONST. Part V, Chapter IV for the structure and powers of the 
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Implicit in this unusual power, which encroaches on the legislature’s 
domain, is the expectation that the executive will exercise it cautiously. 
Security ordinances, with their departures from domestic and 
international legal standards, are a very bold exercise of executive 
lawmaking power, and arguably against the spirit of Article 123 of the 
Indian Constitution. Taking the AFSPA as an example, granting extra 
powers to the armed forces affects an important precept of India’s 
constitutional design as well as democratic governance more generally: 
civilian control of the military. It is striking, therefore, that the national 
government chose to pass an ordinance that engages this core principle 
at all, rather than acknowledging that issues this controversial should 
be left to the popularly elected legislature to debate. The executive’s 
lack of moderation seems particularly pronounced because it passed the 
Armed Forces (Assam & Manipur) Special Powers Ordinance only 
twelve days after a session of Parliament had been adjourned.161 
A strategically timed executive ordinance gives the government of 
the day an advantage when the ordinance is eventually placed before 
Parliament to convert into legislation or to reject. By this point, the new 
law is a fact on the ground rather than a possibility. The government 
may already have established new institutional mechanisms, such as 
special courts or executive review boards, or be working towards 
implementing them. Because the ordinance will only be in place for a 
few weeks or months, concerns that the law will allow violations of 
individual rights can be dismissed as hypothetical, because there isn’t 
a substantial empirical record on the effects of the ordinance at that 
point. Opponents of the law thus face the prospect of dismantling 
something already in place, and the accusation of being lenient about 
the country’s security. As a result, the price of opposition will be 
higher, and the resulting debate in Parliament is likely to be muted. It 
is certainly the case that, so far, the legislature has endorsed security 
ordinances, and converted them into laws, with relative ease. 
More recently, the national government has used security ordinances 
even more overtly to force a particular result in Parliament. In 2001, 
the POTA was preceded by not one but two executive ordinances.162 
The second of these ordinances was promulgated after the opposition 
 
Supreme Court; INDIA CONST. Part VI, Chapters II and III for the structure and powers of 
state executives and legislatures; INDIA CONST. Part VI, Chapter V for the structure and 
powers of state High Courts. 
161 See supra note 159. 
162 The Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance, Ord. 9 of 2001 (India) and the Prevention of 
Terrorism (Second) Ordinance, Ord. No. 9 of 2001 (India). 
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in the lower house of Parliament had made clear it was voting against 
the Act, and the ruling alliance was unsure about whether it would get 
the majority it needed to pass the bill into law.163 The second Prevention 
of Terrorism Ordinance was an imposition of the national 
government’s will, preempting the evolving Parliamentary debate. 
On occasion, the national government has used tactics even more 
aggressive than the strategic use of ordinances. When Parliament was 
considering POTA in 2002, government complicity in mass sectarian 
violence in Gujarat concentrated attention on the ways that expansive 
executive powers could be abused.164 Opposition to POTA gained 
momentum in Parliament as a result. In response, the ruling National 
Democratic Alliance called a joint session of Parliament, where the 
lower and upper houses vote as a single body.165 Joint sessions are 
allowed by the Indian Constitution, but are meant to be exceptional 
measures, and have very rarely been used.166 The NDA used its 
 
163 The Congress party, which led the Opposition in Parliament at the time, made public 
its intention to vote against the proposed law. (Indian Express, ‘Congress readies for POTO 
burial’, 17 November 2001, discussed in UJJWAL KUMAR SINGH, supra note 134 at 44). A 
few political parties within the ruling National Democratic Alliance expressed some 
reservations about the draft law as well. See SAD to Oppose POTO if Press Freedom Hit, 
THE TRIBUNE, Nov. 5, 2001, http://www.tribuneindia.com/2001/20011105/punjab1.htm. 
For a discussion of negotiations about POTA between different political parties, see UJJWAL 
KUMAR SINGH, supra note 134, at 40–49. 
164 Discussion regarding Godhra killings and subsequent violence in Gujarat, 
THIRTEENTH LOK SABHA, NINTH SESSION DEBATES, Mar. 11, 2002, http://164.100.47.132 
/LssNew/psearch/Result13.aspx?dbsl=3645 (regarding the state and national government’s 
failure to respond to attacks on Muslims); Regarding violence in Gujarat on 19 March, 
2002, THIRTEENTH LOK SABHA, NINTH SESSION DEBATES, Mar. 20, 2002, http://164.100 
.47.132/LssNew/psearch/Result13.aspx?dbsl=3769 (regarding failure to assist Muslims 
facing violence, failure to arrest perpetrators of violence, and failure to use the Prevention 
of Terrorism Ordinance against perpetrators); Discussion on the Prevention of Terrorism 
Bill, 2002, moved by Shri L.K. Advani. (Bill Passed), THIRTEENTH LOK SABHA, NINTH 
SESSION DEBATES, Mar. 26, 2002, http://164.100.47.132/LssNew/psearch/Result13.aspx 
?dbsl=3795 (debating whether to pass the POTA, members of Parliament who opposed the 
draft law highlighted how the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance had been discriminatorily 
used in Gujarat against Muslims (speeches by Sonia Gandhi, Somnath Chatterjee, H.D. 
Deva Gowda, Kapil Sibal, N.K. Premachandran, P.D. Elangovan, E. Ahamed)). 
165 Regarding the President’s notification for summoning Joint Sitting of the Rajya Sabha 
and the Lok Sabha for the purpose of consideration and voting on the Prevention of 
Terrorism Bill, 2002, THIRTEENTH LOK SABHA DEBATES, Mar. 22, 2002, http://164.100 
.47.132/LssNew/psearch/Result13.aspx?dbsl=3817. The summons from the President of 
India to members of both the lower and upper houses of Parliament for a joint session. 
166 Joint Sessions of the Indian Parliament have been called twice before 2002, once to 
consider the Dowry Prohibition Bill in April 1961 and once to consider the Banking Service 
Commission (Repeal) Bill in December 1977. See UJJWAL KUMAR SINGH, supra note 134, 
at 90. 
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cumulative numbers in both houses to get an easy majority in the joint 
session and pass POTA. In doing so, it circumvented a likely defeat in 
the upper house of Parliament and thwarted the usual balancing role of 
the upper house in legislative debate and scrutiny. 
C. Diluted Debate and Scrutiny 
Thus, the executive has repeatedly commandeered legislative power 
over security laws. As discussed above, the use of ordinances weakens 
debate when the legislature is considering laws that mirror those 
ordinances, and raises the stakes of opposing elements of the ordinance 
that are already being implemented. While the debate that should 
accompany the passage of a law has been diluted, the legislature’s 
power to review these laws after they have been passed has also eroded 
over time. Past security laws, such as the PDA, TADA and POTA, 
included sunset clauses. Such sunset clauses were a mechanism to 
acknowledge the extraordinary—and therefore temporary—nature of 
the powers under these laws, and to review these powers periodically 
and renew them only if a majority of Parliament decided they were still 
required. 
It is telling, however, that the interval between legislative reviews 
increased from earlier laws to later ones, until such reviews were 
abandoned altogether. The PDA provided for annual review by 
Parliament. From 1951 onwards, Parliament renewed the PDA every 
year until 1968, rendering preventive detention powers de facto routine 
and permanent. The PDA’s current successor, the National Security 
Act, 1980 formalized this de facto permanence, and dispensed entirely 
with a sunset clause. Laws creating terrorist offenses followed a similar 
trajectory. TADA provided for review every two years, and POTA for 
review every three years. However, when POTA’s provisions were 
incorporated into the UAPA, these amendments made no provision for 
legislative review. 
It is possible to argue that repeated legislation demonstrates deep 
political support in Parliament for the recurrent, and problematic, 
features of these laws that were highlighted in Part II. However, the 
executive branch has so dominated the legislative process, that this 
seeming consensus may very likely have resulted from a lack of 
sufficient Parliamentary scrutiny and engagement with the 
problematic, rights restricting features of these laws, rather than 
reasoned, substantive support for them. Exploring this question 
empirically is beyond the scope of this Article, but some features of the 
political context are worth considering in this regard. 
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As discussed in Part III, security laws in their current form seem to 
serve as both a crutch and cover in the face of a poorly functioning 
criminal justice system. It is not surprising that security laws have 
appealed to the national government despite changes in political 
dispensation, if they help to avert and distract from the arduous reform 
that the criminal justice system needs. 
When executive ordinances come to be debated in Parliament, the 
extent as well as the content of debate is influenced by the fact that the 
harmful consequences of security laws can easily be perceived as a 
minority issue. Human rights abuses by state functionaries using 
security powers might affect a large number of individuals, but in the 
Indian context they will only ever affect a tiny proportion of people. 
Many who fall within this numerical minority will also be overtly 
different from the norm (or the perceived norm), in their religious 
beliefs, ethnicity, language or regional affiliation. Electoral democracy, 
and the legislative priorities that result, skew away from issues that 
affect minorities, however seriously. Even though the Indian legislature 
includes representatives from a range of political parties, their electoral 
incentives do not favor scrutinizing security legislation in depth, 
particularly where the government of the day is arguing that executive 
powers within a security law are essential for the security of the 
majority. 
This incentive to acquiesce rather than question has shifted on 
occasion, when a particular law has become strongly associated with 
partisan, abusive policing and been heavily criticized in the popular 
press. For example, in the 1970s, the Indian government deployed 
MISA not just against human rights activists perceived as being on the 
fringe, but also against members of large trade unions, student unions, 
and mainstream political parties.167 Similarly, in 2002 when the 
government of Gujarat used the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance 
heavily against Muslims but not against Hindus in the fraught aftermath 
of sectarian violence, a few legislators from constituencies with a high 
proportion of Muslim voters argued against POTA in Parliament.168 
The Indian Parliament is structured to give the government of the 
day a strong role in proposing legislation and an advantage in passing 
it. Where security laws are concerned, this structural advantage has 
 
167 PAUL R. BRASS, THE POLITICS OF INDIA SINCE INDEP. (Cambridge Univ. Press 
1994), at 40–43; GUHA, supra note 15, at 493–500. 
168 See supra note 164. Parliamentary debates on passing POTA. See also UJJWAL 
KUMAR SINGH, supra note 134, at 40–49, 167–70. 
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calcified over time into executive dominance over the entire legislative 
process. Parliament passes the executive’s proposed bills, or as has 
happened more often, endorses the executive’s ordinances that have 
already been implemented before they are considered by the 
legislature. The executive’s aggressive use of its constitutional power 
has limited the thorough debate that security laws warrant. As a result, 
the crucial checking and balancing function that Parliamentary debate 
and scrutiny should play has little purchase over security legislation. A 
change of government in New Delhi has sometimes meant that the 
outgoing government’s flagship security law is jettisoned.  But such 
repeal has aimed more to reject the taint of a particular law rather than 
genuinely debate and discard those of its features that created room for 
abuses to proliferate. 
V 
JUDICIAL APPROVAL 
Within a democratic constitutional order, independent courts of law 
play, in theory, a rights protective, countermajoritarian role.169 Judges 
do not have to face the electorate, so they should be more willing to 
protect the rights of minorities, even very small or unpopular ones.170 
The Indian judiciary is well placed to scrutinize, check and balance 
executive power. The Indian Constitution grants the Supreme Court the 
power to review whether legislation is constitutional.171 The Supreme 
Court and High Courts can receive petitions directly from citizens 
seeking to enforce their constitutional rights,172 and exercise strong 
remedial powers in response.173 
 
169 Walter F. Murphy, Civil Law, Common Law, and Constitutional Democracy, 52 LA. 
L. Rev. 91 (1992). 
170 For a discussion of instances when courts in Western common-law jurisdictions have 
protected minority rights in national security cases, see Kent Roach, Judicial Review of the 
State’s Anti-Terrorism Activities: The Post 9/11 Experience and Normative Justifications 
for Judicial Review, 3 INDIAN J. CONST. 138, 156–58 (2009). 
171 INDIA CONST. art. 13. lays down that any law that is inconsistent with or derogates 
from fundamental rights is unconstitutional. 
172 INDIA CONST. art. 32. empowers individuals to move the Supreme Court in order to 
enforce their fundamental rights, and empowers the Supreme Court to issue directions or 
orders or writs, including writs of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and 
certiorari, in order to enforce fundamental rights recognized in the Constitution. INDIA 
CONST. art. 226 similarly empowers High Courts to issue writs of habeas corpus, 
mandamus, prohibitions, quo warranto and certiorari in order to enforce fundamental rights. 
173 INDIA CONST. art. 142. Provides, inter alia, that the Supreme Court “may pass such 
decree or make such order as is necessary for doing complete justice in any cause or matter 
pending before it, and any decree so passed or orders so made shall be enforceable 
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Since the early 1980s, the judiciary has wielded its robust 
constitutional powers rather forcefully. In long running public interest 
litigation, the Supreme Court and many High Courts have issued 
detailed directions to governments, shaping policies, monitoring 
compliance,174 and sometimes going as far as to create de facto 
legislation.175 However, in contrast to its activist stance in a range of 
cases alleging large-scale violations of constitutional rights, India’s 
higher judiciary has been far more cautious when considering national 
security matters. In this Part, I look at how the Indian Supreme Court 
has responded when the constitutionality of security laws has been 
challenged. I consider in particular four Supreme Court decisions since 
1980.176 The four decisions include the Court’s 1982 decision in A.K. 
 
throughout the territory of India.” INDIA CONST. art. 144 obligates “all authorities, civil and 
judicial” to “act in aid of the Supreme Court.” For a more detailed discussion of remedial 
powers under the Constitution of India, see Christine M. Forster & Vedna Jivan, Public 
Interest Litigation and Human Rights Implementation: The Indian and Australian 
Experience, 3 ASIAN J. COMP. L. 1, 4–6 (2008). 
174 See Christine M. Forster & Vedna Jivan, supra note 173; see also SANGEETA AHUJA, 
PEOPLE, LAW AND JUSTICE: A CASE-BOOK ON PUBLIC-INTEREST LITIGATION (Orient 
Longman 1997). 
175 See Vishaka & Ors. v. Rajasthan, (1997) 6 S.C.C. 253 (India). The “Vishaka case”, 
in which the Supreme Court defined sexual harassment in the workplace and pending 
legislation on the issue, gave detailed guidelines on prevention and redress. See also Surabhi 
Chopra, Holding the State Accountable for Hunger, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WKLY., 8 
(Aug. 5, 2009) (discussing long-running litigation on the right to food where the Supreme 
Court made a series of far-reaching orders on provision of food for the destitute). 
176 The early 1980s, after the end of the Emergency, are seen as the beginning of a new 
assertiveness by the Indian Supreme Court, after the Court’s support for the executive during 
the Emergency. For a discussion of the Emergency generally, see GUHA, supra note 15. 
On July 22, 1975, the Constitution of India was amended to bar judicial review of the 
declaration of Emergency and the legality of the election of the Prime Minister. The 
government suspended the enforcement of fundamental rights to equality under Article 14, 
life and personal liberty under Article 21 and due process during arrest and detention under 
Article 22. During the 18-month period of constitutional Emergency, the Supreme Court 
upheld the Prime Minister’s stark violations of law. In a notorious decision, A.D.M. Jabalpur 
v Shivakant Shukla, (1976) 2 SCC 521 (India), the Court overruled High Courts that had 
issued writs of habeas corpus in response to petitions challenging preventive detention. The 
Supreme Court ruled that the judiciary did not have the jurisdiction to review preventive 
detention orders under MISA even if these orders went beyond the legal power given to the 
executive or were issued in bad faith. For a discussion of this cases, see Mrinal Satish & 
Aparna Chandra, Of Maternal State and Minimalist Judiciary: The Indian Supreme Court’s 
Approach to Terror-Related Adjudication, 21 NAT’L L. SCH. INDIA REV. 51 (2009). After 
the Emergency, the higher judiciary’s assertiveness, particularly in reviewing the 
enforcement of constitutional rights, is widely understood as a bid to rebuild credibility and 
public trust. On this point, see Christine M. Forster & Vedna Jivan, supra note 173, at 4. 
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Roy v. Union of India177 (AK Roy) which dealt with the constitutionality 
of the National Security Act, Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab178 (Kartar 
Singh) in 1994 which addressed the constitutionality of TADA, Naga 
People’s Movement of Human Rights v. Union of India179 (Naga 
People’s Movement) in 1998 which considered AFSPA’s 
constitutionality, and People’s Union of Civil Liberties v Union of 
India180 (PUCL) in 2004 which decided on the constitutionality of 
POTA. 
Each of these four cases was elaborate. In three out of the four cases, 
the petitioners argued that the national legislature did not have the 
authority to pass the law as a whole. In all four, petitioners argued that 
several individual provisions of the law infringed provisions in the 
Constitution. And on each occasion, the Supreme Court ruled very 
substantially in favor of the state. 
A. Challenges to Parliament’s Legislative Authority 
Petitioners’ arguments about legislative competence rested upon the 
Constitution’s division of legislative authority between the national 
legislature and state legislatures.181 The petitioners argued in each case 
that state legislatures have exclusive authority to legislate on “public 
order,”182 and therefore the national legislature was not constitutionally 
competent to pass the law in question. This argument was dismissed 
without much ado every time. The Court maintained that security laws 
deal with threats more elevated than public disorder, and the national 
legislature, which is constitutionally empowered to legislate on matters 
 
177 A.K. Roy v. India, (1982) 1 SCC 271 (India) [hereinafter A.K. Roy]. 
178 Kartar Singh v. Punjab, (1994) 3 SCC 569 (India) [hereinafter Kartar Singh]. 
179 Naga People’s Movement of Human Rights v. India, AIR 1998 SC 432 (India) 
[hereinafter Naga People’s Movement]. 
180 People’s Union of Civil Liberties v. India, (2004) 9 SCC 580 (India) [hereinafter 
PUCL]. 
181 The Indian Constitution grants the national legislature exclusive power to legislate on 
matters in List I or the Union List in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. The 
Constitution grants state legislatures exclusive power to legislate on matters in List II or the 
State List. Both national and state legislatures have authority to legislate on matters in List 
III or the Concurrent List. See INDIA CONST.  art. 246 and List I, List II, and List III of the 
Seventh Schedule. 
182 “Public order” falls within the state legislature’s exclusive legislative authority.  
INDIA CONST. List II, Entry 1. 
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concerning the “defense of India,” has clear authority to pass these 
laws.183 
This result was hardly surprising. The Constitution expressly allows 
preventive detention by national and state governments, and by 
implication allows the national government to pass legislation 
regulating such detention.184 While the Constitution does not directly 
address terrorism and separatist movements, the national government 
argued persuasively that these issues concern national defense and 
therefore the national legislature had the authority to pass anti-terrorism 
laws and AFSPA.185 Even if the Constitution had been unclear, the 
Supreme Court would not have resolved such ambiguity by divesting 
the national legislature of legislative authority on terrorism and armed 
insurgency. To do so would have implied that India’s twenty state 
governments with their varying capacities, jurisdictions and resources 
could draft laws on the nation’s security, but the national government 
could not. 
B. Challenges to Expansive Executive Powers 
While the petitioners might have overreached in challenging 
Parliament’s authority to legislate on security in general, their 
challenges to particular provisions of the NSA, TADA, POTA, and 
AFSPA respectively were rigorous and persuasive on the whole. All 
four petitions concentrated on the ways in which the laws at issue 
departed from ordinary criminal law. They elucidated how these 
departures were incompatible with a range of constitutional rights. The 
Court rejected most of these arguments. Below, I discuss some of the 
main strands of argument by the petitioners, as well as the Supreme 
Court’s response. I concentrate on challenges to the characteristics of 
security laws and the corresponding executive powers highlighted in 
Part II. 
1. Ambiguous Scope 
In A.K. Roy, which challenged the NSA, the petitioners argued that 
the grounds for preventive detention were too wide, having been 
transposed from the Constitution into ordinary law without any attempt 
 
183 Kartar Singh, supra note 178; Naga People’s Movement, supra note 179; PUCL, 
supra note 180. 
184 See discussion supra Part II.C. 
185 See Kartar Singh, supra note 178, ¶ 54; PUCL, supra note 180, ¶ 3. 
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at precise statutory definition.186 The Court responded by ruing the 
“imperfections of language,”187 but insisting that “a certain amount of 
minimal latitude” was necessary in order to make preventive detention 
laws effective.188 Arguments in Kartar Singh about broadly drafted 
powers in TADA to declare an area “terrorist affected” and establish 
special courts within it received similar treatment from the Court.189 
While the Supreme Court dismissed arguments that government 
powers should be clearer and narrower, challenges to ambiguity in the 
mens rea requirement of criminal offenses received a more favorable 
response. In Kartar Singh, the Court read a mens rea requirement into 
the offense of abetment, holding that imprecision could render a legal 
provision arbitrary and “void for vagueness.”190 It followed this 
precedent in PUCL and clarified that the offense of abetment required 
intention and the offense of unauthorized possession of arms required 
knowledge of possession.191 
2. Special Security Measures in Demarcated Zones 
In Naga People’s Movement, the Court held that the power to declare 
an area “disturbed” was neither arbitrary nor unguided,192 even though 
AFSPA lays down no guiding criteria for such a declaration. The court 
also rejected any suggestion that the military’s extensive powers to 
search, seize property, arrest people and use force against them were 
excessive.193 In Kartar Singh, the Court responded in similar ways to 
arguments against the executive’s power to constitute special courts in 
a “terrorist affected area.” It held that the TADA implicitly required 
that terrorist or “disruptive” activities were of a scale and seriousness 
that warranted special measures.194 
The Supreme Court did inject one important limit into the 
executive’s power under AFSPA to create a zone where the military 
has generous leeway to use force. The Court held that the words of 
AFSPA implied a time bound declaration, and therefore, a declaration 
that an area is “disturbed” cannot take effect for more than six months 
 
186 A.K. Roy, supra note 177, ¶ 63. 
187 A.K. Roy, supra note 177, ¶ 67. 
188 A.K. Roy, supra note 177, ¶ 66. 
189 Kartar Singh, supra note 178, ¶ 137. 
190 Id. ¶¶ 127, 130–133. 
191 PUCL, supra note 180, ¶¶ 25, 27. 
192 Naga People’s Movement, supra note 179, ¶ 41. 
193 Id. ¶¶ 47–55. 
194 Kartar Singh, supra note 178, ¶ 138. 
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at a time.195 While this does not prevent national or state governments 
from renewing declarations repeatedly, it does force a formal 
reconsideration every six months. 
3. Preventive Detention Powers 
Preventive detention is constitutionally authorized, so it follows that 
a law cannot be invalid for allowing such detention per se. In A.K. Roy, 
the petitioners did not question the legality of preventive detention in 
and of itself, but argued that the procedure established by the NSA 
violates the rules of natural justice because it bars legal representation 
for detainees as well as cross-examination in hearings before the 
advisory board—the administrative review mechanism established by 
the NSA. The Supreme Court reminded the petitioners that the 
Constitution did not extend the right to legal representation to 
individuals who are preventively detained.196 However, the Court failed 
to consider that while the Constitution does not grant the right to legal 
representation to detainees, it does not expressly bar this right either. 
Therefore, it was possible to draw upon common law principles on fair 
procedure to read in such a right while still respecting the Constitution. 
The Court went further and upheld statutory provisions on which the 
Constitution is silent, such as the NSA’s ban on cross-examination 
during advisory board hearings, and the government’s unrestricted 
power to determine conditions of detention and punish infractions by 
detainees.197 
To justify these conclusions, the Court elaborated that the NSA 
could attenuate procedural rights for advisory board hearings because 
detention depends upon the decision maker’s subjective satisfaction 
rather than a judge’s decision at trial.198 The Court’s position was that 
procedural rights under criminal law were meant to apply specifically 
during criminal trials, and therefore, it was entirely permissible to 
remove these rights, and have far lower procedural protection, during 
a different type of proceedings. 
The implications of the Court’s reasoning are disturbing. During 
criminal proceedings, the rights of the defense are meant to guard 
against miscarriages of justice. A law on preventive detention that 
allows the state to restrict an individual’s liberty without having to 
 
195 Naga People’s Movement supra note 179, ¶ 43. 
196 A.K. Roy, supra note 177, ¶ 92. 
197 Id. ¶ 114. 
198 Id. ¶ 105. 
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prove guilt before a court, carries a greater risk of arbitrary or 
unreasoned decisions. Therefore, individuals who are preventively 
detained should have correspondingly higher procedural protection and 
more liberal conditions of detention than individuals undergoing 
criminal trials. However, the Supreme Court did not address this 
pressing question of principle, nor did it justify why attenuated 
procedural rights were necessary in the particular context of security 
related administrative detention. Instead, the Court’s position places 
little weight on long-standing common law principles such as the right 
to a fair hearing and allows the government to dispense with basic 
procedural protections simply by creating a forum technically distinct 
from a criminal trial. 
4. “Status Offenses” and the Power to Proscribe Organizations 
The Supreme Court staunchly upheld executive power to tag 
organizations as “unlawful” or “terrorist,” as well as the power to 
prosecute terrorist offenses in special courts. It upheld the procedure 
for banning organizations laid down in the UAPA, TADA, and POTA. 
The Supreme Court dismissed petitioners’ arguments in PUCL that 
expansive powers under POTA to declare associations as “terrorist” 
violated the constitutional right to freedom of association.199 It held that 
creating the status offenses at issue was permissible, particularly given 
the magnitude of terrorism and the goals of the challenged 
legislation,200 and pointed out that the challenged powers were valid 
because the Constitution allows restrictions on freedom of 
association.201 However, simply because a right is not absolute and can 
be restricted should not be enough, in and of itself, to validate an 
individual restriction, particularly an onerous one.202 The Court did not 
 
199 PUCL, supra note 180, ¶ 41. 
200 Id. ¶ 42. 
201 Id. 
202 INDIA CONST. art. 19, § 4 permits “reasonable restrictions” on the right to form 
associations or unions, “in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India or public 
order or morality.” While some rights under Chapter III of the Indian Constitution are 
absolute rights, such as the right against forced labor recognized in INDIA CONST. art. 23, 
most rights are expressly or impliedly qualified. See generally South Asia Human Rights 
Documentation Centre, Human Rights in the Indian Constitutional Framework, HUMAN 
RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN LAW: DEVELOPMENTS IN INDIA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, 
205–94 (2008). The manner in which rights are recognized and framed in the Indian 
Constitution is similar to the way civil and political rights are structured under the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 
(ICCPR), even though the catalogue of civil and political rights recognized in the Indian 
Constitution overlaps with but is not identical to the rights recognized in the ICCPR. Most 
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consider how far freedom of association could be limited, and whether 
these particular governmental powers restricted it too far. 
5. Enhanced Powers to Investigate and Prosecute 
Procedural innovations in TADA and POTA that disadvantaged the 
defense were also upheld in Kartar Singh and PUCL respectively. The 
Supreme Court stated that defendants under TADA and POTA fell 
within a “distinct class of persons,” and approved of this distinct class 
being subject to provisions allowing 180-day pre-charge detention and 
a prima facie assessment of innocence as a precondition for bail. Some 
provisions did divide opinion. Justice Sahai dissented vehemently in 
Kartar Singh against the admissibility of confessions to police officers 
as evidence during trial.203 However, the majority in Kartar Singh held 
that allowing custodial confessions as evidence was neither “unjust” 
nor “oppressive”, merely recommending that judges be vigilant about 
detecting impropriety by the police.204 Parliament’s legitimate 
authority to pass the laws in question, as well as “the gravity of 
terrorism unleashed by . . . terrorists”205 swayed the majority on 
custodial confessions. Only one provision of TADA—allowing 
identification based on photographs—was unanimously struck down as 
unconstitutional.206 Since POTA incorporated so many provisions from 
TADA, the precedent set by Kartar Singh on these provisions disposed 
 
rights enumerated in the ICCPR are qualified rights. An individual’s exercise of a qualified 
right can be limited in light of the rights of others or the larger public interest. A few rights 
are absolute rights, in that these rights cannot legitimately be subject to legal limits. 
Examples of absolute rights include, inter alia, the right to be free of torture and cruel, 
inhuman and degrading treatment under Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (ICCPR), and the right to 
nondiscrimination under Article 2 of the ICCPR. Accordingly, there are no circumstances 
under which it would be lawful to discriminate against an individual or to torture an 
individual or subject him or her to cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment. When evaluating 
an alleged limitation on an absolute right, courts should assess whether the law or official 
conduct being challenged constitutes a limitation, and if it does, that law or official act is 
incompatible with the right. When evaluating an alleged limitation on a qualified right, 
courts should engage in a different enquiry and assess where the limit imposed by the law 
or official conduct being challenged is compatible with the right in question. A limit on a 
qualified right will not inevitably be incompatible with the right, but might be incompatible 
if it is based on impermissible criteria or if it goes too far. 
203 Kartar Singh, supra note 178, ¶¶ 454–456. 
204 Id. ¶ 253. 
205 Id. 
206 Id. ¶ 361. 
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of arguments raised by petitioners in PUCL on similar provisions in 
POTA. 
6. Power to Create Special Courts 
Special courts were challenged in Kartar Singh for violating the 
constitutional right to equality. The petitioners argued that defendants 
on trial in special courts navigated less favorable courtroom procedure 
and faced less independent judges than in a regular trial court. As it had 
done in relation to restrictions on bail, the Supreme Court upheld the 
creation of special courts on the ground that persons tried under the 
TADA were “a distinct class of persons”207 who could therefore be 
treated differently from other criminal defendants without infringing 
the right to equality. 
The Court sidestepped the fact that defendants under TADA were 
not prosecuted under that law because they belonged to some prior, 
already differentiated “distinct class of persons”; they were placed in a 
distinct class precisely because they were being prosecuted under that 
particular law. Given the ambiguous scope of TADA offenses, and 
overlap with offenses under the Indian Penal Code, many TADA 
defendants could potentially have been tried under ordinary criminal 
law in regular trial courts with greater procedural protections. Thus, 
individuals tried in special courts were placed in a “distinct class of 
persons” by decision makers—police and prosecution officials—with 
considerable discretion to do so. Prosecution under TADA rather than 
the Indian Penal Code was not a neutral fact on the ground, but rather 
a prosecutorial choice, with very serious consequences for defendants. 
The Supreme Court glossed over this, and simply did not consider the 
genuine question of whether broadly drafted offenses in concert with 
special courts resulted in discrimination against TADA defendants. 
The Court also summarily dismissed arguments that the executive’s 
substantial control over judicial appointments to special courts sat 
uneasily with constitutional provisions on judicial independence and 
clearly departed from usual procedure. It emphasized Parliament’s 
competence to enact the law as a whole, conflating the legislature’s 
institutional authority to enact the law in question with the very 
different question of whether the resulting method of appointing judges 
to special courts infringed constitutional provisions on judicial 
independence.208 
 
207 Id. ¶ 220. 
208 Id. ¶¶ 159–161. 
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While upholding provisions related to special courts with no 
hesitation, the Supreme Court recommended a measure that suggests 
some unease over the long-term use of such courts. The Court 
recommended, but, importantly, did not order, that the government 
appoint a committee to review regularly whether special courts were 
still needed.209 
7. Limits on Judicial Review 
In Kartar Singh, the Supreme Court proclaimed its special role in 
preserving the rule of law, “[T]here is no institution to which the duty 
can be delegated except to the judiciary.”210 Early in PUCL, the Court 
acknowledges “clear [Constitutional] limitations on . . . State actions 
within the context of the fight against terrorism”211 and further that the 
judiciary has the responsibility “[t]o maintain this delicate balance by 
protecting ‘core’ Human Rights.”212 On occasion, the Supreme Court 
cited citizens’ ability to challenge government actions in court as one 
of the reasons that provisions encroaching on constitutional rights are 
acceptable. In PUCL, for example, the Court upheld status offenses on 
the ground that an organization can contest the decision to ban it in 
court.213 
However, while the Supreme Court presented review by the higher 
judiciary as an important check, it also preserved statutory limits and 
hurdles to judicial review. The Court had no quarrel with decision-
making powers that required only the subjective satisfaction of the 
decision maker, such as the power to preventively detain someone or 
the power to declare an area disturbed under AFSPA.214 As discussed 
earlier, statutory powers of this nature restrict courts to reviewing 
whether the decision maker used the proper procedure, which under the 
terms of the NSA and AFSPA involves checking only if the official in 
question was of the correct rank. Nevertheless, the Court did not 
require—or even recommend obiter dictum—that these powers be 
amended to include decision-making criteria that add some rigor and 
certainty, and reduce the potential for arbitrariness. 
 
209 Id. ¶ 362. 
210 Id. ¶ 366. 
211 PUCL, supra note 180, ¶ 15. 
212 Id. ¶ 15. 
213 Id. ¶¶ 37, 42, 37. In Kartar Singh, supra note 178, ¶ 247, the Court makes the same 
point, and notes that it has granted compensation to victims of fundamental rights violations. 
214 Naga People’s Movement supra note 179, ¶ 41. 
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The Supreme Court also uniformly rejected challenges to 
administrative review mechanisms. It disagreed with arguments in A.K. 
Roy that advisory boards did not accord preventive detainees a fair 
hearing.215 In PUCL, the Court similarly rebuffed arguments that 
review committees did not give banned organizations genuine 
opportunity to challenge the national government’s decision to 
designate them as terrorist groups.216 The petitioners’ argument that the 
national government had too much power over appointing members of 
review committees met a similar fate.217 
The Court affirmed administrative review mechanisms, with their 
lack of independence and highly abbreviated procedural protections. It 
did not expressly acknowledge that administrative review delayed 
access to judicial review, or that limits on disclosure to evidence made 
it difficult for applicants to credibly challenge the government’s 
decision to detain or ban them. Further, when the Supreme Court 
recommended additional checks and balances—as in Kartar Singh 
where it suggested that the national government appoint a screening 
committee to review legal proceedings as well as state governments’ 
actions under TADA218—these suggested measures were also 
committees appointed exclusively by and responsible only to the 
national government. 
C. Assessing the Supreme Court’s Security Jurisprudence 
1. Championing Executive Powers 
On the one hand, the Supreme Court stressed its special 
responsibility for upholding rights and curbing unlawful state behavior. 
On the other hand, it deferred greatly to the executive and to the 
legislature in all four petitions, and was reluctant to actually wield the 
review powers that it had emphasized. The security laws challenged in 
A.K. Roy, Kartar Singh, Naga People’s Movement, and PUCL, all 
emerged largely unscathed. The Court struck down only one provision 
of TADA. It remedially interpreted a handful of provisions in TADA, 
POTA, and AFSPA, reading a mens rea requirement into offenses that 
were ambiguously framed219 and reading a six-month review 
 
215 A.K. Roy, supra note 177, ¶¶ 88–90. 
216 PUCL, supra note 180, ¶ 39. 
217 Id. ¶ 39. 
218 Kartar Singh, supra note 178, ¶ 265. 
219 Id. ¶ 127; PUCL, supra note 180, ¶¶ 25, 27. 
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requirement into the state’s power under AFSPA to designate an area 
as “disturbed.”220 Each law was upheld as a whole, and most individual 
provisions in each also survived the Court’s review with ease. 
The Supreme Court also occasionally adopted a dialogic mode of 
review221—rather than striking down or remedially interpreting an 
executive power, it suggested nonbinding checks and balances. Some 
suggestions were concrete—the Court proposed that the national 
government set up a committee to review how TADA was being 
used.222 Other suggestions were so obvious as to seem superfluous. The 
Court suggested that trial judges remain aware that custodial 
confessions might be coerced.223 When offering nonbinding 
suggestions, the Court could have considered what good domestic 
practice or international standards would point towards. Instead, these 
obiter dicta proposals cleaved very close to the contours of the law at 
issue, suggesting that the government appoint ad hoc review bodies. 
In Naga Peoples Movement, the Supreme Court made an ostensibly 
binding order that, on closer examination, is more akin to a nonbinding 
order. The Court directed that the Indian army treat as “binding” an 
internal list of “dos and don’ts” for using AFSPA powers.224 However, 
the Supreme Court did not read these guidelines into AFSPA or any 
other relevant legislation. It failed to clarify if victims of violence could 
apply for compensation on the grounds that soldiers using AFSPA 
powers acted against these internal guidelines. The Supreme Court also 
chose not to monitor whether national and state governments or the 
armed forces complied with its orders. By contrast, in many other 
constitutional rights cases, the Court has used remedies such as 
structural injunctions to examine whether the executive is 
implementing measures to ameliorate widespread or chronic 
government failures.225 
The Court suggested self-restraint and self-monitoring by national 
and state governments, in the face of considerable evidence that 
officials and institutions have abused their security powers. In the 
Court’s analysis, abuse of power is an aberration; officials are clearly 
 
220 Naga People’s Movement, supra note 179, ¶ 43. 
221 See generally Mark Tushnet, Dialogic Judicial Review, 61 ARK L. REV. 205 (2009). 
222 Kartar Singh, supra note 178, ¶ 265. 
223 Id. ¶¶ 263–264. 
224 Naga People’s Movement, supra note 179, ¶ 63. 
225 See Shubhankar Dam, supra note 154. 
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to be trusted and seniority is seen as a self-evident safeguard when 
exercising extraordinary powers. For example, in A.K. Roy, the Court 
upheld the devolution of preventive detention powers to district level 
officials.226 It noted that “a certain amount of minimal latitude has to 
be conceded” to make the law effective, without acknowledging that 
executive discretion under the NSA is considerably more than 
minimal.227 In PUCL, the Court upheld a controversial provision that 
effectively denied journalists and lawyers the ability to keep sources or 
client information confidential. While doing so, it had little patience 
with arguments that Investigating Officers, fairly junior police 
officials, might overuse the power to demand confidential information, 
stating “[o]f course the IOs will be circumspect and cautious.”228 In 
Naga People’s Movement, the Supreme Court affirmed that 
noncommissioned officers, who are also relatively junior, can exercise 
shoot-to-kill powers because they have the necessary “status and 
experience” to do so.229 Vast executive discretion was thus, largely 
treated by the Court as unremarkable and its extraordinary scope as 
necessary. 
2. Conflating Legislative Legitimacy with Constitutionality 
On a range of issues across these four petitions, the Supreme Court 
repeatedly underlines that the Indian Parliament had full authority to 
pass the law at issue, and therefore, the particular provision at issue. 
The Court treats its affirmative response to the initial question of 
whether the national legislature could legislate on a particular subject 
as decisive on the very different question of whether a specific legal 
provision was compatible with the Constitution. However, simply 
because an institution exercises legitimate authority does not 
inexorably mean that the outcome of that exercise will, in substance, 
be legitimate. 
The Supreme Court privileges the first step of its inquiry, and avoids 
the heart of the matter—interpreting what the Constitution demands 
and allows. To evaluate whether a provision of ordinary law is 
compatible with the higher law of the Constitution, the Court should 
explicate what the relevant constitutional provisions mean. If the 
meaning of particular provisions has been explored in previous 
decisions, drawing upon those precedents might suffice. Elucidating 
 
226 A.K. Roy, supra note 177, 329–30. 
227 Id. 323. 
228 PUCL, supra note 180, ¶ 37. 
229 Naga People’s Movement, supra note 179, at 533–34. 
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the necessarily general words of constitutional provisions is 
particularly important where statutory provisions seem, on the face of 
it, to be limiting fundamental rights guaranteed by the constitution. It 
is also important where these statutory provisions depart from long 
established legal standards within a jurisdiction, as many provisions in 
TADA, POTA, and AFSPA did. Previous jurisprudence, developed 
around challenges to ordinary criminal law, might not address the 
questions raised by these new, far more extensive, provisions. 
In A.K. Roy, when interpreting the rather loosely worded 
constitutional provisions on the executive’s ability to pass ordinances 
that limit fundamental rights, the Court declares that the Constitution 
“is what it says and not what one would like it to be.”230 The Court does 
not acknowledge that in interpreting constitutional provisions abstract 
enough to accommodate a range of meaning, it shapes the content and 
scope of those provisions. Avoiding its own activist interpretive stance 
in other types of decisions,231 the Supreme Court chose a far more 
perfunctory role for itself when reviewing security laws.232 In A.K. Roy, 
the earliest of the four decisions considered here, the Supreme Court 
did, indeed, consider what rights Article 22 of the Indian Constitution 
granted to persons who were preventively detained. In its subsequent 
decisions, however, the Court did not grapple with the content of 
constitutional rights implicated by the statutory provisions at issue, 
which included in particular the rights to a fair trial, equality, freedom 
of association, and life and liberty. 
Typically, in these decisions, the Supreme Court simply declares 
that a contested statutory provision does not violate a particular 
constitutional right. A more rigorous way to reach the same result 
would be to acknowledge that the provision in question limits a 
constitutional right, but on considering the content of the right, find that 
the limitation is an acceptable one. A disaggregated analysis that 
acknowledges rather than elides a limit would be more transparent. 
Further, clarity is not its only advantage. Such analysis more effectively 
protects the constitutional right over the long term. When the Court 
 
230 A.K. Roy, supra note 177 at 273. 
231 See Forster & Jivan, supra note 173, at 4; see also Ahuja, supra note 174; Chopra, 
supra note 175. 
232 See Satish & Chandra, supra note 176, at 52 (arguing that the Indian Supreme Court 
interprets statutes, rather than the Constitution, when it reviews anti-terror laws and engages 
in minimalist interpretation when doing so, deciding cases on the narrowest grounds 
sufficient to decide the issues before the court). 
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simply asserts that, for example, special court trials conducted inside 
prisons, or custodial confessions admitted as evidence against 
codefendants, do not raise, even prima facie, any fair trial concerns, 
this affects the ambit of the right itself. Such reasoning paves the way 
for arguments that the right to a fair trial does not include trials in open 
court or strong safeguards against coerced confessions. By contrast, 
acknowledging that a particular measure constrains how an individual 
can exercise a constitutional right, but justifying that constraint would 
help to limit that constraint to situations where a compelling 
justification exists. 
In a few instances, the Supreme Court takes a step beyond simply 
asserting that a statutory provision is constitutionally valid. The Court 
notes in addition that the Constitution allows a particular constitutional 
right—whether the right to a fair trial or the right to equality or freedom 
of association—to be limited. As discussed above, the Supreme Court 
offered this justification when upholding provisions banning 
organizations in POTA.233 Although somewhat less cursory than an 
unreasoned assertion, this approach too is an elision. Very few rights 
are absolute, but simply because a right can be limited does not mean 
that any limit is permissible, as the Court’s articulation would imply. 
In national security cases, the Supreme Court has treated the 
legislature’s choice about how far to limit a right—or, more accurately, 
the executive’s choice on this question—as decisive. For example, the 
Court ignored some arguments about potential discrimination under 
security laws,234 and rebutted others in a manner that entirely begged 
the question at hand. Petitioners argued the special regulation created 
by security laws, coupled with wide executive discretion and overlap 
with ordinary law, created the potential for discrimination because for 
substantially similar actions, one person might be investigated and 
prosecuted under one set of rules, and another person under a different, 
more onerous set of rules. The Supreme Court consistently responded 
that differential regulation was not discriminatory because the relevant 
law created such regulation and that individuals processed under 
 
233 PUCL, supra note 180, ¶¶ 41–42. 
234 See PUCL, supra note 180, ¶¶ 35–42 (ignoring arguments based on the right to 
equality, the Court upheld statutory provisions giving the police power the ability to compel 
individuals, including lawyers and journalists, to disclose information and provisions related 
to classifying an organization as “terrorist” without notice, publicly declared reasons, or a 
hearing). 
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different rules fell in a special category.235 While upholding the NSA’s 
provisions on advisory board procedure in A.K. Roy, the Court 
dismissed the argument that procedural rights be proportionate to the 
loss involved—loss of freedom in this instance—for the individual.236 
It rejected the idea of a “prescribed standard of reasonableness,” stating 
instead that the “availability of rights . . . can’t be decided generally” 
and has to be decided “on the basis of statutory provisions which 
govern the proceedings, provided that provisions are constitutionally 
valid.”237 Rather than evaluating whether statutory provisions 
conformed to constitutional norms, the court deflected challenges to 
statutory standards by circular reliance on those very statutory 
standards. Thus, through these four decisions, the Supreme Court 
envisions constitutional rights not as binding constraints, but as what is 
left over after the executive enhances its powers to use force and detain 
individuals.238 
3. Selective Attention to Sociopolitics 
When affirming contested provisions, in all four decisions the court 
underscored threats to national security as validating, or even 
necessitating,239 that particular provision or the law that it was a part of 
as a whole. In Kartar Singh, the Court noted, “[r]ules of natural justice 
cannot remain the same applying to all conditions . . . However 
unsavoury (sic) the procedure may appear to a judicial mind, these are 
facts of life which are to be faced.”240 References to security threats are 
measured in A.K. Roy, but tend towards the overwrought in later 
 
235 See, e.g., Kartar Singh, supra note 178, at 222; Naga People’s Movement, supra note 
179, at 47–55. 
236 A.K. Roy, supra note 177, at 88. 
237 Id. at 89. 
238 Gearty argues that, in the early 1800s, a Hobbesian conception of unconstrained 
armed force as a necessary bulwark against chaos gained more influence than competing 
ideas of security that valued individual autonomy and the constraints this implied for state 
power. He argues that the common law reflected and reproduced this Hobbesian view of 
security as the most important function of the state. The corollary to this was an arid 
conception of individual liberty as the residue that remains after the sovereign has secured 
law and order. See Conor Gearty, Escaping Hobbes: Liberty and Security for our 
Democratic (Not Anti-Terrorist) Age (London Sch. of Econ., L., Soc’y & Econ., Working 
Paper No. 3/2010), http://www.lse.ac.uk/collection/law/wps/WPS2010-03_Gearty.pdf. 
239 See Kartar Singh, supra note 178, ¶ 19 (saying that the legislature was “forced . . . to 
enact” security laws early on in its judgment, before it has really considered any of the 
petitioners’ arguments). 
240 Id. ¶ 284. 
CHOPRA (DO NOT DELETE) 3/31/2016  8:52 AM 
56 OREGON REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 17, 1 
decisions. In Kartar Singh, the Supreme Court says that “impugned 
enactments” have to be evaluated against the “totality of the series of 
events due to the unleashing of terrorism, waves after waves . . . [of] 
blood-curdling incidents during which the blood of sons of the soil had 
been spilled over the soil of their motherland.”241 In PUCL, the Court 
opines, “[o]ur country has been the victim of an undeclared war by the 
epicenters (sic) of terrorism”242 and then notes that the “[f]ight against 
the overt and covert acts of terrorism is not a regular criminal justice 
endeavour (sic) . . . To face terrorism we need new approaches, 
techniques, weapons, expertise and of course, new laws.”243 
Clearly, the challenge of controlling terrorist violence is a 
fundamental consideration in the Supreme Court’s evaluation of 
security laws, and by extension, the protection afforded to 
constitutional rights. However, the court’s attention to the 
sociopolitical context in which security laws operate is rather selective. 
It ignores petitioners’ submissions—which were borne out by 
considerable empirical evidence—on how expansive executive powers 
under security laws have been abused in serious and recurring ways. In 
PUCL, for example, the court refused to consider “hypotheticals” about 
how contested statutory provisions could be abused.244 It neglected the 
fact that most provisions in POTA had previously been a part of TADA, 
so arguments about potential abuse were based on past abuse of the 
same or very similar executive powers, and therefore deserved serious 
consideration. Several years previously in Kartar Singh, Justice Sahai’s 
dissent drew attention to widespread torture in police custody.245 
However, the majority in Kartar Singh responded by upholding the 
admissibility of custodial confessions during trial, and arguing that it 
was time “to take a small positive step towards removing this stigma 
on the police,” citing the “increasing earnestness and commitment” of 
senior police officials against custodial torture.246 
Thus, the Supreme Court treats the threat of terrorism and separatism 
as an overwhelming, unarguable fact on the ground, which calls for the 
exceptional legal frameworks set up by the laws considered in this 
Article. It should then be willing to consider how these frameworks as 
a whole abridge access to basic rights such as fair trial, freedom of 
 
241 A.K. Roy, supra note 177, ¶ 67. 
242 PUCL, supra note 180, ¶ 7. 
243 Id. ¶ 9. 
244 Id. ¶ 22. 
245 Kartar Singh, supra note 178, ¶ 453. 
246 Id. ¶ 450. 
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association, or freedom of expression. Instead, the Court evaluates each 
contested provision in isolation, without considering how different 
provisions interact, and therefore, how a particular provision 
contributes incrementally to the cumulative limit that the law as a 
whole places on a particular constitutional right. Thus, the Supreme 
Court evaluated the admissibility of custodial confessions without 
considering the fact that a suspect under TADA or POTA could be held 
in police custody, and pretrial detention generally, for a very long 
period of time and was therefore more vulnerable to pressure than an 
ordinary suspect. Similarly, the Court refused to grant fuller procedural 
rights for preventively detained individuals during administrative 
review without weighing the fact that review boards were ad hoc bodies 
appointed by the government of the day. While evaluating individual 
legal provisions segregated from their larger statutory framework, the 
Supreme Court has willfully ignored relevant empirical evidence and 
neglected to take constitutional norms seriously. As a result, it has 
evaded a genuine reckoning with the security laws being reviewed. The 
Court has interpreted the law—statutory as well as constitutional—to 
loosen constitutional constraints over the executive’s room for 
manoeuvre and, therefore, to confine the span of a constitutional right 
so as to validate the powers with which the executive has endowed 
itself. When evaluating security laws, the Supreme Court’s interpretive 
stance upends the traditional relationship between statutes and 
constitutional provisions, with the latter being reduced to whatever the 
former will permit. 
VI 
DIRECTIONS FOR REFORM 
I began this Article by stating that India’s national security laws 
operate outside effective constitutional checks and balances, and that 
this fosters human rights abuses and diminishes the scope of 
constitutional rights. This is not to say that security legislation, in a 
literal sense, has not been passed by the legislature or has not been 
reviewed by the judiciary. As such, it is possible to perceive the 
trajectory of security laws as evidencing deep principled preference 
across all branches of the Indian state for the particular features and 
resulting executive powers discussed in Part II above. However, as I 
have argued above, this seeming unanimity results not from reasoned 
agreement but from a failure to attend closely to the effects of such 
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unfettered executive power and to take seriously the constitutional 
standards that that security laws should meet. 
As discussed in Part IV above, India’s national government has 
made aggressive, excessive use of its ordinance making power to press 
security ordinances into service, preempting and diluting legislative 
deliberation in the process. While many individuals have their rights 
restricted and abused by state actors using security powers, those who 
are directly affected by security laws have neither the numbers nor the 
political influence to stir significant debate or sway many votes in 
Parliament. As a result, the legislature has endorsed, rather than 
reviewed or reformed, executive led security legislation. 
Just as parliamentary scrutiny of security laws has been mild, 
judicial review has been deferential. As a result, the executive branch 
dominates lawmaking in this arena and exercises power with little 
restraint. This skewed institutional dynamic has lasting constitutional 
consequences. India’s current and past security laws treat constitutional 
rights as immaterial rather than binding. When interpreting these laws, 
the judiciary in its turn has treated constitutional rights as modifiable 
and dispensable indulgences, such that whatever remains after the 
executive has claimed extraordinary powers to use force and detain 
individuals is considered adequate. 
India is not the only constitutional democracy where judicial review 
of security laws has been timid and legislative debate lukewarm. 
Tushnet discusses how the traditional separation of powers has failed 
to check executive excesses in the United States since September 11, 
2001, and he goes as far as to suggest creating a new constitutional 
body with the special mandate to review executive decisions on 
national security.247 Brooks argues that the international law of armed 
conflict continues to categorize conflicts in ways that cannot 
adequately guide states on how to tackle modern-day terrorism. She 
advocates that the international law of armed conflict be substantially 
reformed so it can better regulate national law and policy on security.248 
Under regulated security powers have had such serious effects that 
fundamental reforms of the sort that Tushnet and Brooks suggest might 
be warranted, and even necessary. However, designing paradigm 
shifting reform and marshaling political support for it is arduous and 
protracted. In India, both the process and content of security legislation 
 
247 Mark Tushnet, Controlling Executive Power in the War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. 
REV. 2673, 2681–82 (2005). 
248 Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, War Everywhere: Rights, National Security Law, and the 
Law of Armed Conflict in the Age of Terror, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 675, 755–61 (2004). 
CHOPRA (DO NOT DELETE) 3/31/2016  8:52 AM 
2015] National Security Laws in India: 59 
The Unraveling of Constitutional Constraints 
is so skewed towards the executive that even modest reform would 
improve these laws and better regulate the executive’s security powers. 
With this in mind, I focus below on how to improve judicial review of 
security laws and restructure the laws themselves in order to foster 
decision making that does not regard rights as remnants. 
A. Restoring Judicial Review 
Rigorous judicial review is essential in checking and balancing 
executive power under security laws. In Part V above, I argued that the 
Indian Supreme Court neglects constitutional and international norms 
when reviewing security laws, denuding the content of constitutional 
rights in the process. This normatively barren deference amounts to 
judicial retreat, harms the rule of law, and leaves individuals vulnerable 
to serious abuses. For the individual citizen and for the rule of law, it is 
important that the Court shift its approach. It can do so by concentrating 
on the substantive content of constitutional rights, drawing upon the 
rich resources offered by its own rights jurisprudence outside the 
national security context, comparative jurisprudence from other 
constitutional democracies, and international human rights law. 
In all four decisions discussed above, the Court rarely referred to 
international human rights norms, and used this material somewhat 
tendentiously. In PUCL, the Court suggests that U.N. S.C.R. 1373 
obligates India to pass a new anti-terrorism law.249 However, although 
U.N. S.C.R. 1373 requires states to take certain anti-terrorism 
measures, particularly related to terrorist financing, it does not demand 
a new law and certainly does not require the particular measures the 
Indian government imported from TADA into POTA. Further, while 
the Supreme Court invoked international law in support of POTA, it 
did not engage with international law on human rights, such as the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which India is 
a party, or the jurisprudence of the U.N. Human Rights Committee 
 
249 PUCL, supra note 180, ¶¶ 10–13. The Supreme Court echoed the view of India’s 
Minister for Home Affairs when the Prevention of Terrorism Bill was first introduced in 
Parliament, who stated that India had “a duty to the international community” to pass this 
law. See Parliament of India, Joint Session Debate (Mar. 26, 2002), http://164.100.24.208 
/debate/debtext.asp?slno=3795&ser=&smode=t (statement of L.K. Advani); Lok Sabha 
Debate (Mar. 18, 2002), http://164.100.24.208/debate/debtext.asp?slno=3791&ser=&s 
mode=t (statement of L.K. Advani). 
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under the ICCPR.250 Such omissions by the Supreme Court were 
missed opportunities. 
International human rights law has the advantage, as Brooks points 
out, of applying at all times to all individuals, regardless of whether the 
state is dealing with dangers it considers extraordinary.251 The 
standards in the ICCPR, along with the jurisprudence of the United 
Nations Human Rights Committee would be especially relevant to 
interpreting security laws. The Indian Supreme Court has tended to 
treat national security or the more nebulous “public order” as an 
unassailable trump that permits almost any limit on a right. 
International law such as the General Comments of the UNHRC252 or 
the Siracusa Principles253 can assist in defining and evaluating 
limitations on the grounds of national security and public order. 
Petitioners, in turn, should frame arguments with reference to 
international standards, thus pushing the judiciary to contemplate 
seriously how far a right can be constrained. 
The Supreme Court should elucidate the content of a constitutional 
right with reference to international and comparative standards, and 
consider how far limitations might extend without rendering the right 
meaningless. It should then evaluate whether rights limiting statutory 
provisions meet these standards. In order to do this, it should adopt the 
well established proportionality approach, inquiring whether a 
statutory provision that, prima facie, limits a constitutional right 
pursues a legitimate aim, and if so, whether the rights limiting means 
chosen to achieve that aim impose the smallest possible restriction on 
the right in question. When evaluating a statutory measure—
admissibility of custodial confessions for example—courts should 
demand convincing evidence from the government supporting the need 
 
250 India acceded to the ICCPR on April 10, 1979. See United Nations Treaty Series, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171; 1057 U.N.T.S. 407 (Dec. 16, 1966), http://treaties.un.org/Pages/View 
Details.aspx?mtdsg_no=IV-4&chapter=4&lang=en%23EndDec. 
251 Brooks, supra note 248, at 747. 
252 See, e.g., U.N. Human Rights Committee, CCPR General Comment No. 29: Article 
4: Derogations during a State of Emergency (Aug. 31, 2001), http://www.refworld.org 
/docid/453883fd1f.html; U.N. Human Rights Committee, CCPR General Comment No. 11: 
Article 20: Prohibition of Propaganda for War and Inciting National, Racial or Religious 
Hatred (July 29, 1983), http://www.refworld.org/docid/453883f811.html; U.N. Human 
Rights Committee, General Comment No. 34: Article 19: Freedoms of Opinion and 
Expression (July 21, 2011), http://www.refworld.org/docid/4e38efb52.html. 
253 U.N. Commission on Human Rights, The Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and 
Derogation Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Sept. 
28,1984), http://www.refworld.org/docid/4672bc122.html. 
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for that particular measure in order to evaluate whether the aim is 
legitimate and the measure reasonable, rather than being satisfied with 
insufficiently examined appeals to the vital need for security. If a 
statutory provision limits a right more than is necessary to achieve its 
intended aim, that disproportionate limitation should make the 
provision unacceptable. 
Balancing tests do not, of course, completely inoculate against 
excessive deference in national security cases, and can be used to put a 
gloss on arbitrary laws or policies. But, as Roach254 and Wells255 point 
out, despite its malleability, proportionality analysis at least steers 
courts towards overtly reasoned decisions. Structured analysis would 
sideline the sort of high-strung hypotheticals that run through Kartar 
Singh and PUCL, and concentrate attention on the likely effect of a 
particular provision. The structure of the test—its focus on whether a 
limitation goes further than necessary—would encourage both 
petitioners and respondents to draw upon comparative and international 
jurisprudence to support their arguments. 
Applying an established test that facilitates evidence-based 
reasoning is especially important when evaluating security laws 
because judges, government officials, and legislators will be more 
prone to bias on this topic than on many others. Armed conflict and 
terrorist attacks leave vivid memories. Revulsion at arbitrary violence, 
sympathy for victims, and fear of future attack might all lead decision 
maker to overestimate threats or devalue due process and basic 
liberties.256 The Indian Supreme Court has clearly tended to do this 
when asked to review security legislation. 
As discussed in Part V, the Supreme Court treats security threats as 
an omnipresent menace against which few holds should be barred. 
When reviewing security laws, it has typically asserted without 
explication that statutory provisions under challenge comply with the 
Constitution. On occasion, the Court has reasoned a little more 
explicitly, and stated that the compass of a constitutional right depends 
upon the particular statutory scheme at issue. In doing this, the Supreme 
Court has subordinated constitutional provisions to the aim and content 
of security laws, rather than treating constitutional norms as the prior 
standard against which laws should be measured. There is one instance 
 
254 Roach, supra note 170. 
255 Christina Wells, Fear and Loathing in Constitutional Decision-Making, 2005 WIS. L. 
REV. 115, 220–26 (2005) (noting that Wells discusses “balancing tests” in the U.S. context). 
256 Id. at 160–79. 
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in Kartar Singh when the Court does treat the relevant constitutional 
provision as a prior standard, but it articulates a somewhat startling test 
for evaluating statutory provisions in light of this prior standard. The 
Court asks whether a challenged provision “completely denies” a 
constitutional right and is “tyrannical and despotical (sic) in character;” 
if not, the provision is valid.257 In effect, unless a statutory provision 
repudiates a right entirely, it is valid. Proportionality analysis—with its 
focus on least restrictive means—imposes a test that protects rights far 
better than the principles articulated in the Supreme Court’s security 
jurisprudence. 
Applying consistent legal analysis to questions of national security 
is imperative because security laws bearing the particular features 
discussed in Part II have been a long-standing part of India’s legal 
landscape, as have human rights violations facilitated by these laws. If 
the courts consistently adopt reasoned review grounded in specifics, 
this will compel the government to proffer cogent evidence for a 
measure rather than facile invocations of an all-encompassing security 
threat. Over time, empirically grounded, proportionality based judicial 
reasoning might influence how the executive drafts security legislation 
in the first place, prodding governments to weigh how past security 
laws have actually been used on the ground and to respect due process 
and individual liberties when designing the executive’s security 
powers. 
B. Reforming Security Legislation–Shared Discretion, Regular 
Scrutiny 
Improving legal drafting and design is a live issue. Security laws 
have been repealed and legislated fairly often in India, particularly after 
national elections where the incumbent political formation was 
defeated.258 So, even though the particular features discussed in Part II 
recur in different generations of laws, there is opportunity, albeit slim, 
for reform after a change of government. Opportunities for legislative 
reform also present themselves when security laws are amended; the 
UAPA was amended in 2008, incorporating many provisions from the 
previously repealed POTA, and then amended again in 2013.259 
 
257 Kartar Singh, supra note 178, ¶ 97. 
258 See discussion supra Part I pp. 4–12. 
259 Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Amendment Act, No. 3 of 2013, INDIA CODE 
(2012). 
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Legislative reforms should tackle the troubling features of security 
laws—and the attendant executive powers—discussed in Part II. 
Obvious and pressing reforms would include restoring the many 
procedural rights of the defense that have been diluted or divested 
entirely, focusing first on the biggest departures from international 
legal standards. Extraordinary powers in “disturbed” areas as well as 
status offenses would need to be redesigned. Laws should be amended 
so that offenses such as “committing a terrorist act” or “disturbing 
public order” are less nebulous, and police and prosecutorial power is 
correspondingly more confined. Preventive detention laws should be 
repealed; the Constitution permits but does not insist upon peacetime 
administrative detention without charge and the Indian government 
should choose restraint. More fundamentally, exhortations by human 
rights groups to amend the Constitution in this regard deserve serious 
consideration. 
Human rights groups, domestic and international, have 
recommended reforming India’s anti-terrorism laws, preventive 
detention laws and AFSPA for many years. They have traced how these 
laws depart from international legal standards and detailed the 
substantive and procedural changes needed to conform to these 
standards.260 I do not intend to rehearse in detail recommendations that 
have already been laid out on several occasions with depth and rigor. I 
focus instead on reforms that could better regulate the executive’s 
exercise of power under security laws. 
I argued above that neither the legislature nor the judiciary engaged 
sufficiently with the effects of the executive’s sweeping security 
powers or with constitutional norms. However, if mandatory legislative 
and judicial scrutiny were threaded through security laws, this would 
lead to regular deliberation about the effects of security powers and 
where their boundaries should lie. Laws should be redesigned so that 
other branches of the state participate in decisions that are currently the 
exclusive preserve of the executive. Discretion can be segmented to 
varying degrees. Introducing checks and balances into the exercise of 
security power might mean building a judicial or legislative role into 
the actual decision, or mandating that the executive’s decision be 
reviewed after it is made and endorsed or overturned or, at a minimum, 
 
260 See, e.g., SARDCH, supra note 58; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 19; AMNESTY 
INT’L, supra note 116; PEOPLE’S UNION OF DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS, supra note 119; Civil 
Society Coalition on Human Rights in Manipur and the U.N., supra note 124. 
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requiring that the executive report all decisions of a particular nature to 
the judiciary or legislature. 
Security laws require decisions that have an immediate and direct 
effect on the liberty of an individual, such as detaining an individual 
without charge. They also involve decisions that do not have an 
immediate effect on a specific individual, such as bringing an area 
under the purview of AFSPA. Some decisions are made at a remove 
from the individuals affected, such as whether to designate an 
organization as unlawful or terrorist. Others are made in the thick of 
rapidly unfolding events, such as whether to open fire or arrest 
someone, or whether to continue interrogating a tired suspect if he 
seems likely to admit guilt. The nature of the decision would influence 
whether and how other branches of the state can be involved in decision 
making. Clearly, some decisions—whether to open fire would be an 
archetypical one—are not amenable to advance authorization or 
subsequent quashing and can only be reported after the fact. In general, 
however, the greater the immediate and direct limit on an individual’s 
rights, the more closely the executive should be scrutinized. 
Additionally, decision-making powers should be altered to include the 
highest checks and balances compatible with the particular type of 
decision at hand, with shared decision making where possible, routine 
legislative or judicial review in the alternative, and regular reports to 
the legislature or judiciary at a minimum. Below, I suggest reforms 
relevant to the executive powers discussed earlier in Part II. 
In concrete terms, replacing the executive’s monopoly on decision 
making with shared discretion, subject to regular scrutiny would mean 
that anti-terrorism laws require the national government to report to 
each session of Parliament the number of people investigated, arrested, 
charged, and prosecuted across India in that year and the preceding one. 
Such information should be broken down by state, caste, religion and 
ethnicity. The government should also report whether trials result in 
acquittal or conviction, and whether the prosecution appealed any 
acquittals. State governments should similarly have the parallel 
obligation to the state legislature. 
Security offenses should be prosecuted in regular criminal courts. 
However, if special courts are retained in order to expedite terrorism 
trials, the government should remove legal provisions allowing courts 
to be convened in locations such as prisons that are effectively closed 
to the public. By the same token, laws should add provisions obliging 
national and state governments to periodically report the number and 
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duration of trials to Parliament and state legislatures, so that the 
effectiveness of special courts can be queried and evaluated. 
Regular reports on the criminal justice process under security laws 
would give legislators a sense of how anti-terrorism laws are actually 
being used. This would help legislators to discern if anti-terror laws are 
being used heavily in states that rarely see violence by non-state actors. 
It is likely to throw into relief any patterns of ethnic and religious 
profiling by the government. If, as in the past, the majority of arrests 
under anti-terrorism laws do not lead to prosecution, and prosecution 
seldom leads to conviction, and if acquittals are infrequently appealed, 
these patterns could be publicly debated. Regular empirically grounded 
reports will make it harder for legislators to ignore the de facto 
preventive detention that occurred under laws like TADA, POTA, and 
might be continuing under the UAPA. It might encourage legislators to 
ask the executive—as they are entitled to—for further information. 
More fundamentally, regular scrutiny of such information might lead 
legislators to query more closely which particular executive powers are 
genuinely useful, and which are superfluous and prone to abuse. 
Status offenses have gained currency in different common law 
jurisdictions since 2001.261 However, the Indian model stands out for 
the limits it places on judicially reviewing government decisions on 
whether an organization is lawful. Rather than deciding unilaterally 
that an organization is a “terrorist association,” the government should 
apply to a judge for such a declaration, presenting evidence in its favor. 
The law could also provide for the executive’s declaration to have 
immediate effect in limited circumstances, and be endorsed or 
overturned as soon as possible by a judge. In any event, individuals 
affected by the decision should be able to apply for judicial rather than 
administrative review, and should have access to legal representation. 
Other common law jurisdictions offer examples of tribunals where 
advocates with special security clearance can view evidence that cannot 
be aired in open court.262 While such schemes have been criticized, a 
special advocate mechanism would improve upon the current 
 
261 Kent Roach, The Criminal Law and Terrorism, in GLOBAL ANTI-TERRORISM LAW 
AND POLICY 142 (V. Ramraj et al. eds., 2005); see also Roach, supra note 74. 
262 See generally John Ip, The Rise and Spread of the Special Advocate, PUB. L. 717 
(2008); John Ip, The Adoption of the Special Advocate Procedure in New Zealand’s 
Immigration Bill, N.Z. L. REV. 207 (2009); David Jenkins, There and Back Again: The 
Strange Journey of Special Advocates and Comparative Law Methodology, 42 COLUM. 
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 279 (2011). 
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prohibition on legal representation for groups designated “unlawful” or 
“terrorist” in India.263 Judicial determination of status should be 
supplemented by legislative scrutiny, with national and state 
governments being required to report banned organizations to 
Parliament and state legislatures on a regular basis. 
Preventive detention is eminently amenable to similar checks, with 
the executive proposing detention but the judiciary sanctioning it based 
on the government’s evidence, and the legislature being asked to 
review the number of detainees and their characteristics every time it 
is in session. Given that individuals are detained based on the suspicion 
that they are likely to pose a security threat, it is particularly important 
that a judge determines whether the grounds for suspicion are sound. If 
the legislature, every time it is in session, reviews who is being 
detained, for how long and whether detainees have been detained or 
prosecuted previously, it is more likely to detect and challenge 
discriminatory as well as serial detention. 
Part II discussed how declaring a geographical zone “disturbed” or 
“terrorist affected” under laws like AFSPA and TADA has serious 
consequences for inhabitants of that area. At present, the executive 
alone can declare an area disturbed and renew or lift that declaration. 
Under the Constitution, the national government has the power to 
declare a national emergency264 or take over the governance of a 
state,265 but such decisions are effective for a few weeks at most unless 
both houses of Parliament endorse them.266 Given the serious 
 
263 Cian C. Murphy, Counter-Terrorism and the Culture of Legality: The Case of Special 
Advocates, 24 KING’S L.J. 19 (2013); Craig Forcese & Lorne Waldman, Study 
commissioned by the Canadian Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies and the Courts 
Administration Service, Seeking Justice in an Unfair Process: Lessons from Canada, the 
United Kingdom, and New Zealand on the Use of ‘Special Advocates’ in National Security 
Proceedings  (2007), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1623509; Susan Nash, Special Advocacy: 
Political Expediency and Legal Roles in Modern Judicial Systems; 9 LEGAL ETHICS 101 
(2006); see Colin Harvey, And Fairness for All? Asylum, National Security and the Rule of 
Law, in GLOBAL ANTI-TERRORISM LAW AND POLICY (V. Ramraj et al. eds., 2005) 
(generally discussing how changes to immigration and asylum law since 2001 damage the 
rule of law). 
264 INDIA CONST. art. 352, § 1. 
265 INDIA CONST. art. 356, § 1. 
266 A declaration of emergency under Article 352 of the India Constitution ceases to have 
effect after a month, unless it has been approved by both houses of parliament. A declaration 
that secures legislative approval within a month is effective for a maximum of six months. 
See INDIA CONST. art. 352, §§ 4–5. A decision under Article 345 that the constitutional 
machinery in a state has failed and needs to be taken over and some or all the functions of 
the state government ceases to have effect after two months unless it is approved by both 
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consequences of declaring an area in some way distinct from the rest 
of the country, governments’ declaratory power under laws like 
AFSPA should be structured like declarations of emergency under the 
Constitution, evanescing in a few weeks without legislative 
endorsement and subject to clear, short time limits even with the 
legislature’s approval. 
At present, the police and armed forces in a disturbed area are 
shielded from prosecution to an extent that shades into impunity. To 
ameliorate this, the government of the state that has been designated, 
wholly or partially, as “disturbed” should be required by law to report 
to each session of the state legislature the arrests and shootings within 
the disturbed area since the legislature last met. Any death caused by 
state agents wielding security powers should compulsorily be 
investigated by a member of the judiciary, who should have the power 
to order prosecution if this is warranted. Preferably, prosecution of 
government officials should not require special permission from the 
executive branch at all. More modest, and more politically attainable, 
reform might entail giving the judiciary power to determine whether 
permission to prosecute should be granted, allowing the court to hear 
the prosecution, the victim of the alleged offense and the national 
government on the issue. Further reaching reform would shift the 
default from needing special permission to prosecute to having such 
permission, but allowing the executive to argue that prosecution should 
not be allowed in particular cases. 
CONCLUSION 
The current mechanisms for executive accountability allowed by 
Indian security laws are weak and after the fact. Criminal prosecution 
of government officials who were acting under security powers has to 
be explicitly authorized by the national government, and in any event 
cannot be driven by victims of rights violations. While the Supreme 
Court sets great store by the corrective and preventive powers of 
judicial review, this remedy is practically inaccessible to most people. 
Few can afford to approach the High Court in the state capital, or the 
Supreme Court in New Delhi, paying legal fees as the matter inches its 
way through the delays routine in Indian courts. 
 
houses of parliament. After securing legislative approval, such a decision is effective for a 
maximum of six months. See INDIA CONST. art. 352, §§ 3–4. 
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If the executive’s decisions are subject to scrutiny at an earlier stage, 
this can serve both to prevent and correct abuse. For example, if a judge 
rejects the government’s decision to preventively detain someone 
because the evidence is dubious, this rejection prevents loss of liberty. 
If all preventive detention had to be routinely reported to the 
legislature, the government would almost certainly be questioned if the 
number of detainees increased suddenly, or if many detainees were 
from a particular religious or ethnic group. 
The checks and balances suggested in Part VI would improve 
existing arrangements because they would be built into particular 
decisions, and regulate the exercise of specific powers as a matter of 
routine. Parliamentary debate and judicial review veer towards the 
cursory when an entire law is at issue. It is a big step to vote against or 
strike down a law, or even particular provisions of a law. However, 
while judges and legislators have demonstrably hesitated to excise 
sweeping executive powers from security laws, they are likely to be 
bolder when scrutinizing discrete decisions made using these statutory 
powers. The specificity of these decisions would make it easier to 
discern if they are hasty, biased, or likely to foster abuse. Judges and 
legislators would be more likely to grasp the interests, vulnerabilities 
and rights of individuals affected by a particular exercise of security 
powers, rather than treating affected individuals as an abstract 
hypothetical. The granular, limited nature of decisions would make it 
easier to disagree with the government. Legislative scrutiny and 
decision making based on the suggestions above would be unlikely to 
attract whips or block voting by political parties in the legislature, 
which would create room for small interest groups and individual 
conscience to have an influence. Because mechanisms for regular 
scrutiny of security powers lower the stakes of disagreeing with the 
executive, they are more likely to harness debate and negotiation, both 
principled and strategic, within the legislature and between different 
branches of the state. 
Reform of India’s security laws—whether substantive or 
procedural—will not be easy to push through, given that certain core 
security provisions have recurred in different generations of laws. 
However, building support for reforms to better regulate executive 
power will be easier than reforms that remove certain powers entirely. 
Once reforms of this nature are legislated, they have reasonably good 
odds of gaining leverage. The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence indicates 
that, while it may be deferential to the executive, it is reluctant to cede 
jurisdiction over security laws. When reviewing security laws, the 
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Court has disregarded arguments by the government that would have 
ousted its jurisdiction over particular executive powers.267 Political 
competition inherent in a democratic electoral system is likely to 
similarly incline the legislature to retain review and scrutiny powers for 
itself. Once these powers are in place, political parties in the opposition 
are unlikely to welcome amendments that strip them of authority, even 
if they are sanguine about provisions that limit individual rights. 
Building granular checks and balances into security laws will not 
remove the problematic, rights limiting features discussed in Part II. 
But it will ameliorate their capacity to facilitate human rights abuse. 
Security laws in India present a troubling oxymoron. They establish 
extraordinary regulation and place sweeping limits on rights, but are so 
deeply entrenched as to be, in any meaningful sense, ordinary. These 
laws have created long running exceptions to constitutional checks and 
balances that leave individuals vulnerable to abuse. While the 
government’s far reaching powers under security laws have expanded 
over time, the other branches of the state have retreated, leaving the 
executive overly dominant. Moreover, national security is an arena 
where governments can too easily dismiss non-state critics, however 
cogent, by citing their ignorance of classified information or 
questioning their patriotism. The legislative and judicial reforms that I 
have proposed have the potential to unsettle this harmful equilibrium. 
Multiple, routine, regular checks and balances stitched into the 
executive’s exercise of security powers will compel public deliberation 
and, as a result, encourage reasoned decision making. This in turn, will 
push against the steady diminution of constitutional constraints that has 
allowed Indian security laws to operate as charters for abuse. 
  
 
267 In Naga People’s Movement, the Supreme Court of India did not address arguments 
by the state that the judiciary could not review the decision to declare an area as being 
disturbed, but overturned the Gauhati High Court’s decision that a declaration had been 
made on insufficient grounds. See Naga People’s Movement, supra note 179 ¶¶ 72–84. In 
A.K. Roy, the court refused to reach a conclusion about whether the president’s “satisfaction” 
about whether to issue an ordinance was justiciable on the ground that there was insufficient 
material before the court to consider the issue. See A.K. Roy, supra note 177, ¶ 14. 
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